Free English Translation of Swiss Federal Court Decision on Fenerbahce Match-Fixing

Federal Court Tribunal federal Tribunale federale Tribunal federal

{T} 0/2
4A_324 / 2014

Judgment of 16 October 2014 First Civil Law Division

Federal Judge Klett, president, Federal Judge Kolly, Federal judges hollow, Kiss, Niquille Court: Leemann.

Fenerbahge Spor Kulübü,
Represented by
Dr. Bernhard Berger and Dr. Andreas Güngerich,


Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA)
represented by Dr. Jean-Marc Reymond and lawyer Delphine Rochat, Respondent.
International Arbitration,

Complaint against the arbitral award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on 11 April, 2014.



A.a. Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (complainant) is a professional football club based in Istanbul, Turkey. He is a member of the Turkish Football Federation (TFF).

The Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA, Respondent) with headquarters in Nyon is the European Football Association, which also includes the Turkish Football Federation. It organizes, inter alia, the UEFA Champions League.

From. On 21 and 26 February, on 6, 7 and 20 March and 9 April 2011 several football matches were played under the Turkish "Süper Lig" in which persons in the vicinity of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü bribes for Match loss allegedly paid.

On April 14, 2011 entered a new Turkish law (no. 6222) entered into force which provides for a special offense for match-fixing.

On 17 and 22 April and 1 May 2011 more football games from the "Süper Lig" took place, in which people are paid in the context of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü money to influence games.

On May 5, 2011 gave Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü UEFA the signed form "UEFA Club Competitions 2011/2012 Admissions Criteria Form" A, with the Football Club confirmed since April 27, 2007 to have been involved in match-fixing, directly or indirectly.
On May 8, 15 and 22, 2011 more Soccer Games of the Turkish Süper Lig were held to have been where paid by individuals with ties to Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü bribes to the opposing team for the game loss.

On May 22, 2011 Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü won the championship in the "Süper Lig" and thus qualified simultaneously for the group matches of UEFA Champions League game of the 2011/2012 season.

A.c. On 3 July 2011, the Turkish police arrested 61 people as part of a wide-scale criminal investigation concerning match fixing in Turkish football. The suspected match fixing among others, the president and vice president, two members, the coach and the financial director of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü, this in connection with various soccer games, the game 2010/2011 season.

On 11 July 2011 the TFF Executive Committee urged the Ethics Commission to launch an investigation into match-fixing in Turkish football.

On 20 July 2011, the Turkish prosecutor provided the TFF Ethics Commission with information and evidence related to the criminal proceedings initiated.

A.d. On 24 August 2011, the TFF Executive Committee UEFA about his decision, the football club Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü informed not to pit in the Champions League this season.

On 25 August 2011, the TFF Arbitration Board had a Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü against
Decision from the TFF Executive Committee imposed vocation.

On appointment of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü against the decision of the TFF Arbitration Board from August 25, 2011 through the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) dismissed the applications to grant interim relief to decide from 9 September and 3 November 2011.

On 2 December 2011, the Turkish prosecutor brought charges against several people, including officials from Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü.

On 3 January 2012, the TFF Disciplinary Committee against Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü and other Turkish football clubs as well as numerous individuals initiated disciplinary proceedings because of match-fixing.

25 April 2012 Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü withdrew his appeal to the TAS, which the decision of the Turkish Association, Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü not to let the game 2011/2012 season competing in the Champions League, became final.

A.e. On 26 April 2012, the TFF Ethics Commission adopted a Report into allegations of manipulation of certain football matches, including those involving Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü was involved.

In its decision of 6 May 2012, the TFF Disciplinary Commission imposed a board member of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü a three-year prohibition on pursuing a one-year ban, football-related activities against the vice president and the coach.


B.A. On June 4, 2012, UEFA received the report of the TFF Ethics Committee of 26 April 2012 Design.

By letter dated 7 June 2012, the UEFA General Secretary urged the chairman of the Control and Disciplinary Committee of UEFA on, disciplinary proceedings against Fenerbahce Spor
Kulübü initiate.

On 2 July 2012, the High Criminal Court decided in Istanbul that of under the leadership
B., the president of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü, a criminal organization formed
was and that officials from Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü in 13 games of the season would 2010/2011 involved in match-fixing. Of the 93 defendants 48 were convicted, among them

- B., the president of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (two and a half years imprisonment for
Forming a criminal organization, three years and nine months and TRY 1'312'500 .-- for match-fixing);

- C., vice president of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (one year and three months imprisonment
for membership in a criminal organization; one years, 10 months and 14 days because of match-fixing);

- D., a board member of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (one year and six months
Imprisonment for membership of a criminal organization; a year 25 [sic] months and 15 days as well as TRY 900,000 .-- for match-fixing);

- E., board member of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (one year and six months
Imprisonment for membership of a criminal organization; one year, one month and 15 days, and TRY 135,000 .-- for match-fixing);

- F., manager of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (one year and three months imprisonment for
Membership in a criminal organization; 11 months, 7 days and TRY 15'626 .-- for match-fixing);

- G., finance director of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (one year and three months imprisonment
for membership in a criminal organization; one year and three months, or TRY 49'980.-
- Buses for match-fixing).
On 31 May 2013, the UEFA disciplinary inspector submitted his report on the existing disciplinary procedures. On June 20, 2013 Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü submitted observations to.

In its decision of 22 June 2013, the Control and Disciplinary Committee of UEFA Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü precluded from participating in the next three UEFA club competitions for which the Football Club would qualify, the third year of the ban was suspended.

B.b. In its decision of 10 July 2013, the UEFA Appeals Chamber overturned the decision of the Control and Disciplinary Committee of 22 June 2013 appointment of Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü back partially and restricted the lock on the next two UEFA club competitions a.

B.C. By submission of July 16, 2013 Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü challenged the decision of the UEFA Appeals Chamber on 10 July 2013 to the CAS and requested suspensive effect. UEFA did not oppose the granting of the suspensive effect.

On July 18, 2013 Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü informed the CAS, which, inter alia, that the parties agreed on the timing procedure.

Also on July 18, 2013 confirmed the TAS in view of the agreement reached between the parties, the suspensive effect. Moreover, it took from the agreement between the parties on an accelerated procedure note that the grounds for appeal to 26 July 2013 and the appeal response to August 9, 2013 submitted, held the oral main negotiation between 21st and 23 August 2013, and a decision to 28th August 2013 is to be like.
On July 26, 2013 Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü filed the grounds for appeal, essentially with the application, the penalty imposed by the UEFA Appeals Chamber in its decision of July 10, 2013 barrier should be set aside; eventualiter was the decision set aside on 10 July 2013, dismissed the case to the UEFA Appeals Chamber.

On 9 August 2013, UEFA submitted its appeal response, in which it requested that the appeal be dismissed and to confirm the decision of the UEFA Appeals Chamber.

On 21 and 22 August 2013, the oral trial was held in Lausanne. A total of 20 designated by the parties were interviewed; on the survey of 13 other witnesses refrained Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü during the trial.

B.d. In an award dated 28 August 2013 (with reasons delivered on 11 April 2014) had the TAS the appeal, upheld the contested decision of the UEFA Appeals Chamber on 10 July, 2013.

With Civil law appeal Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü submits that the Federal Tribunal should the arbitral award of the CAS of 28 August 2013 annulled.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint as is capable of appeal. The TAS moved to dismiss the complaint in its consultation.

The complainant has the Federal Court a replica, the Respondent filed on August 5, 2014 August 26, 2014 rejoinder.

By order of 22 July 2014, the Federal Court dismissed the petition of the complainant to grant suspensive effect.

By order of 1 September 2014, dismissed the application for reconsideration concerning the non-members suspensive effect and confirmed the disposal of 22 July, 2014.


Art. 54 para. 1 BGG
issues its decision of the Federal Court in an official language, usually in that the decision under appeal. Was this edited in another language, the Federal Tribunal uses the official language chosen by the parties. The decision under appeal is in English. Since this is not an official language and the Parties used the Federal Court of the German language, the decision of the Federal Court was made in German.

. 2
190-192 PILA (SR 291) (77 1 Art. Para. Letter a BGG) In the field of international arbitration is the complaint in civil matters under the requirements of Art. Allowed.

2.1. The seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Lausanne. The complainant in the reference point located outside Switzerland (Art. 176 para. 1 IPRG
). Since the parties have expressly excluded the application of chapter 12 PILA, the provisions of this chapter be applicable (Art. 176 para. 2 IPRG).
2.2. Permitted Only those grievances, which in Art. 190 para. 2 IPRG
exhaustively enumerated are (BGE 134 III 186 E. 5 p 187; 128 III 50 E. 1a p.53; 127 III 279 E. 1a S. 282). Under Art. 77 para. 3 BGG
the Federal Tribunal reviews only the grievances which are brought forward and reasoned in the appeal; this corresponds to in Art. 106 Para. 2 BGG
for the violation of fundamental rights and provided by cantonal and intercantonal law (BGE 134 III 186 E. 5 p 187 with references). Appellatorische criticism is inadmissible (BGE 134 III 565 E. 3.1 p 567; 119 II 380 E. 3b S. 382).

2.3. The Federal Tribunal bases its decision on the facts, which the Tribunal has determined (Art. 105 para. 1 BGG
). These include the findings about the life facts of the dispute underlying as well as those regarding the expiry of lower-instance procedure, so the findings about the process the facts, and the name the parties' claims, their factual allegations, legal analyzes, process returns and discovered evidence, the contents of a testimony, an expert or the findings on the occasion of any inspection include (BGE 140 III 16 E. 1.3.1 with references).

The Federal Court, the factual findings of the arbitral tribunal not rectify or supplement, even if it is obviously untrue or on an infringement within the meaning of Art. 95 BGG
based (see. Art. 77 para. 2 BGG, of the application of Art. 97 BGG
Art. 105 Para. 2 BGG
excludes). However, the Federal Tribunal may review the factual findings of the arbitral award, when compared to such factual findings admissible grievances within the meaning of Art. 190 para. 2 IPRG
be or exceptionally considered Noven (BGE 138 III 29 E. 2.2.1 S. 34; 134 III 565 E. 3.1 p 567; 133 III 139 at 5 p 141; with references). In order to claim on an exception to the binding of the Federal Court to the factual findings of the arbitral tribunal and to have the facts corrected or supplemented, shall set forth with reference to the record that the corresponding factual allegations have already been set up process compliant in arbitration proceedings (see. BGE 115 II 484 E. 2a S. 486; 111 II 471E 1c S. 473;. with references).

2.4. The complainant fails to recognize the loyalty of the Federal Court to the findings in the contested decision to process facts when he preceded his legal arguments, a detailed exposition of the facts, in which he describes the background to the dispute and the proceedings from its own perspective and thereby partially from the factual findings of the arbitral tribunal deviating or these expanded without making substantiated exceptions to the binding character facts. The relevant passages have to be ignored.

Irrelevant are the new facts submitted (Art. 99 para. 1 BGG
). So the complainant alleges about, in the meantime, the Turkish Court of Cassation of four judgments against board members have two and dismissed for a new trial in the first instance.

2.5. The Board is fully justified within the period for appeal submitted (Art. 42 para. 1 BGG
). If there is a second correspondence, the complaining party the Replica (see. BGE 132 I 42 E. 3.3.4) must not use it to supplement its complaint or to improve. The replica is to be used only to statements, including the statements in the consultation of other parties give rise (see, BGE 135 I 19 E. 2.2).

Unless the complainant goes in his reply about his remarks can not be considered.

. 3
The complainant alleges that the CAS disregarded the principle of equal treatment of the parties injured (
Art. 190 para. 2 lit. d PILA).

3.1. He argues that the CAS was considered primarily on quickness in judging the appeal despite the extensive process substance and decided only just six weeks after receipt of the appeal and within less than six days after the completion of a multi-day trial in an accelerated procedure instead the dispute to the UEFA rejected. So that the CAS would have the unequal treatment of the parties that had their origin in the procedure before the departments of UEFA continued.

UEFA had in summer 2011 almost two years taken time for them to have the complainant finally delivered its report on the investigations carried out on 10 June 2013, and opened a disciplinary procedure. Then it was "blow by blow" gone until the decision had been like. Before the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Committee he had been admitted for an opinion, although the authoritative report as well as the other documents submitted were very extensive just 10 days. The subsequent proceedings before the UEFA Appeals Chamber was nothing but a farce, it had nevertheless taken from the entrance of the appeal to the decision of 10 July 2013 just five days, the Appeals Chamber - despite his protests - even substantial new evidence of the Respondent have approved.
A comprehensive review and effective judicial protection, the complainant had not received even before the TAS; the extensive dispute was dealt with and dismissed after receiving his appointment in just six weeks the hearing was limited to two days with correspondingly few opportunities for the party and witness interviews.

The expedited procedure before the CAS had agreed voluntarily not the complainant. Basis of the accelerated procedure was the registration form (Admission form) of UEFA have been the must sign a football club, if he wished to take part in UEFA competitions. He would have an accelerated procedure before the CAS not agreed, if there had been an opportunity to participate without signing the appropriate form to the UEFA competitions; the relevant statement could not be invoked against him thus. The difference in treatment was carried out before the association's internal bodies have continued in arbitration before the CAS. The respondent had time trying to force a clarification of the question before the draw to see who could take part in the Champions League season 2013/2014. The complainant had ultimately had no choice but to undergo this dictates the respondent in order to preserve its ability to still be able to participate in this contest. At the expedited procedure before the association's internal organs and the CAS absolutely no serious interest have existed; the Respondent would perform an orderly appeal procedure readily and also can agree to a proper conduct of the arbitration before the CAS. With its unilateral and unnecessary insistence on the implementation of an urgent procedure before the CAS, the respondent has intentionally taken into account that the unequal treatment of the parties and therefore impermissible curtailment of procedural rights before the CAS would have continued. The TAS has the right to equal treatment can only preserve by the dispute - would have remitted to the Respondent - as requested.


Art. 190 para. 2 lit. d PILA
makes the challenge alone because of the mandatory procedural rules pursuant to Art. 182 para. 3 PILA
to. Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal must especially respect the claim of the parties to be heard. This corresponds - with the exception of the right to justification - the in article 29, paragraph 2 BV..
legal constitutional law (BGE 130 III 35 E. 5 p 37 f .; 128 III 234 E. 4b S. 243; 127 III 576 E. 2c S. 578 f.). The law derives in particular the right of parties from to comment on all the judgment essential facts to defend their legal position, to prove their decisive essential factual allegations with suitable and timely manner and form correctly offered funds to participate in the negotiations and the to inspect files (BGE 130 III 35 E. 5 p 38; 127 III 576 E. 2c S. 578 f .; with references). The principle of equal treatment also requires that the parties are treated equally throughout the arbitral proceedings (see. BGE 133 III 139 E. 6.1 p 143).

3.2.2. The party, which is characterized by a denial of due process or another according to Art. 190 para. 2 IPRG

relevant procedural violation for holding disadvantaged forfeited their complaints, if they are not in time brings forward these through arbitration and not every reasonable effort is taking to the defect - if possible - to eliminate (BGE 130 III 66 E. 4.3 p 75; 126 III 249 E . 3c S. 253 f .; 119 II 386 E. 1a S. 388; with references). The federal judicial review of the award process on infringements is thus far a subsidiary, as the parties have to be reported corresponding defects initially the arbitral tribunal so that they can be resolved before the end of arbitration. It contradicts good faith to rebuke a procedural violation only in the context of an appeal, although in the arbitration, the possibility would have been to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to remedy the alleged defect (BGE 119 II 386 E. 1a S. 388). Faithful offense and abuse of rights is especially the party that holds Rügegründe speak in reserve to this nachzuschieben with an unfavorable course of the process and a foreseeable loss process (see BGE 136 III 605 E. 3.2.2 S. 609;. 129 III 445 E. 3.1 p 449; 126 III 249 S. E. 3c 254).


3.3.1. Unless the complainant establishes a procedural violation federal court order, it was not sufficient given the possibility for party and witness interviews during the two-day trial, he can not be heard. It is not clear how he would put forward this alleged deficiency to arbitration; the contrary is clear from the findings of fact in the contested decision that the applicant, the number of called witnesses belittled by itself of first 53 two days before the hearing on 35 and a day earlier on 32, said he was still at the hearing to the hearing refrained from 13 other witnesses called. The complaint is forfeit.

Even with his subsequent shows not on the complainant that he had been reprimanded unequal treatment by the arbitral tribunal during the arbitration proceedings. Contrary to his argument before the Federal Court he gave acting either in his grounds for appeal nor at the hearing to correct the alleged defect in the arbitration. Rather, he referred in his grounds of appeal only to various shortcomings in the association's internal procedure and the TAS requested that the dispute should be rejected to the UEFA Appeals Chamber to new assessment, if the TAS its principal claim, annul the penalties imposed, should not be followed. Shortly before the end of the hearing, the complainant stated that it did not support the accelerated procedure voluntarily, so the procedure should be rejected on the association's internal organs of UEFA. That he, the CAS more time for further comments or inquiry or a repeat or supplement certain steps requested, let alone a difference in treatment would reprimanded to arbitration, the applicant does not point to.

He has not made every effort to work towards a remedy the alleged defect in the current arbitration procedure. He forfeited for the right, in the appeal proceedings before the Federal Court on alleged unequal treatment within the meaning of
Art. 190 para. 2 lit. d PILA
to invoke. In this plea must also not enter.

3.3.2. Anyway, does not point to the complainant how the TAS had him treated differently in the arbitration proceedings (see. BGE 133 III 139 E. 6.1 p 143). Rather, he also criticized the Federal Court mainly the combined internal procedures or the conduct of the Respondent and derives from the facts alleged by him involuntariness of accelerated procedure not from around that the CAS would have to carry out a proper procedure, but sees a difference in treatment rather in the dismissal of his appeal requests by the arbitral tribunal. He's really-is not raised, the other party was, procedurally granted under the arbitration, in which the dispute can be reviewed in fact and in law something that was denied, but criticized in an impermissible manner the content of the contested award ,

. 4
The complainant alleges that the arbitral tribunal, by surprising application of the law his right to be heard (Art. 190 par. 2 lit. d PILA) hurt to have.

4.1. By the Federal Court case law, there is no constitutional claim of the parties to be especially consulted on the legal assessment of the system established by them in the process facts. Nor follows from the right to be heard, that the parties would advance to indicate the essential facts for the decision. An exception exists especially if a court intends to justify its decision by an legal base, to which the parties have not appointed and its relevance not reasonably expect had (BGE 130 III 35E 5 p. 39; 126 I 19 E . 2c / aa 22 S. and E. d / bb p 24; 124 I 49 E. 3c p.52).
4.2. The author submits that UEFA Appeals Chamber had convicted him of eight games and manipulated for false statements in the registration form to (unconditional) two-year exclusion from European club competitions. The CAS would have a conviction for false statements repealed the form used and also found that the applicant had merely tried to manipulate four games. This has however led to no criminal reduction; Instead, the CAS had confirmed the two-year sanction. The complainant referred to the result as a "eye-catching industrial accident" for sentencing at which it came to the sentencing provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADA Code) due to a never thematized in previous processes analogy. The CAS would have but the parties were no opportunity to comment on these "completely surprising analogy".

4.3. Contrary to what the applicant appears to accept that the CAS has not left the sentencing criteria of Article 17 of the UEFA disciplinary regulations (2008 edition) about the benefit of those of the WADA code out of consideration, but has certainly supported for sentencing on that provision. In addition, the arbitration is explicitly addressed as to why it did not reduce the penalty imposed, although it considered "only" in four cases as created in contrast to the association's internal instances of match-fixing. In particular, the CAS held having regard to Article 17 of the UEFA disciplinary regulations, a two-year suspension in the specific case of clearly justified.
The tribunal considered, taking into account its own case, after for match-fixing penalties between one and eight years were imposed, given the particular severity of the case compared with previously assessed match fixing even a penalty at the upper end of this range is appropriate, but it does Reserve left with Note on the principle ultra petita - the respondent had waived an appeal - in the two-year ban. The notice of the TAS that in doping cases comparable penalties are pronounced, which generally offers a two-year ban would impose that would be higher for very serious offenses and to put deep in extenuating circumstances, thus came - contrary to the view in the appeal view - not " the crucial importance for the determination of penalties "to. The CAS was not required in these circumstances, the complainant specifically give an opportunity to comment on the sentencing provisions of the WADA Code.

A hearing to claim infringing surprising application of the law is absent.

. 5
The complainant alleges that the TAS before, for not having examined several of his decisive significant argument in violation of the right to be heard.

5.1. The right to be heard in an adversarial procedure in accordance
Art. 182 para. 3 and
Art. 190 para. 2 lit. d PILA
excludes settled case also claim to justification of an international arbitral award (BGE 134 III 186E. 6.1 with references). Nevertheless, this results in a minimum requirement of arbitrators to consider the key relevant issues, to deal with. This requirement violates the arbitral tribunal, if it disregarded leaves due to an oversight or a misunderstanding rather substantial allegations, arguments, evidence or proof of evidence of a party. This does not mean that the arbitral tribunal must explicitly deal with each individual arguments of the parties (BGE 133 III 235 E. 5.2 with references).


5.2.1. The complainant alleges that the arbitral tribunal, first, it had left some of his arguments entirely out of account in assessing the competence of UEFA to impose sanctions for match-fixing. He had claimed that he did Article 2.06 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League (UCLR) not yet recognized as binding at the time of discharge of some of the controversial games. Given the arbitral tribunal shall have no more expressed as to its argument that the Court of TAS the disciplinary regulations of UEFA must be interpreted objectively by its wording and legislative context. Also on his argument that the interpretation of association rules-especially disciplinary regulations - should take place in doubt at the expense of the user, the CAS had received no word. Moreover, its arguments concerning the interpretation and meaning of the Circular submitted by the respondent at the hearing no. 24/2013 had been the UEFA unaudited and appreciated. If the arbitral tribunal his decisive substantial arguments for missing Criminal expertise of UEFA checked the complainant, it would have had to approve his appointment.

5.2.2. The arbitration leads to the issue of jurisdiction of UEFA to conduct disciplinary proceedings in the contested decision as one of the main issues to be assessed. It took the complainant's position to the effect this together, that the disputed allegations of match fixing relate to championship games of the 2010/2011 season, and thus did not fall within the disciplinary expertise of UEFA by the authoritative association rules.

The tribunal considered in consequence, the competence of the UEFA imposed for match-fixing detail. This clear instruction, among other points to the complainant's argument, according to which UEFA have lacked the necessary disciplinary expertise at the time of his alleged conduct after the then applicable Association rules; such was only introduced subsequently according to the complainant, which is why the responsibility for punishment carried neither Article 50 (3) of the UEFA Statutes nor Article 2.05 or 2:06 UCLR or Article 5 of the Disciplinary Code'll support. The arbitral tribunal considered the issue of the legal basis for sanctioning the issue of match-fixing by UEFA detail by interpreted the above provisions, while also assessed their applicability in terms of time. It manifested itself inter alia on the interpretation and meaning of the Circular no. 24/2013.

The arbitral tribunal may, under these circumstances not be criticized, it breached its minimum duty to examine the key relevant issues and treat (see. BGE 133 III 235 E. 5.2 p 248 with references). Given the detailed reasoning in the contested decision it can be assumed that it has led the complainant into the Arguments field at least by analogy discarded. The arbitral tribunal has the right to be heard by the complainant not infringed by failing 24/2013 expressly dealt with each of its arguments concerning the applicability of Article 2.06 UCLR, to supposedly authoritative interpretation method in Association regulations or the interpretation and meaning of Circular No..

5.3. The complainant alleges further that he had raised during the arbitration that pronounced by the respondent sanction applicable in criminal law principle nulla poena sine lege contrary. However, the arbitral tribunal set up in its decision with this objection in any way apart. Individual titles ( "[...] and were the sanctions imposed in accor dance with the legality principle?" Or "Is there a Sufficient legal basis for the disciplinary measure?") Led to the conclusion to be sure that this issue should be dealt with content , which is not incorrect.

The raised in the complaint - but not further substantiated - allegation that the mentioned headlines turned out to be "pure misnomer", is incomprehensible. The complainant presents itself not in dispute that the arbitration be argument that relied on for the penalty imposed Association provisions, the requirements of the principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege scripta et certa) expressly lists in the decision notice. It directs his remarks to the principle of legality, under the heading "Is there a Sufficient legal basis for the disciplinary measure?" so a, according to Swiss law and established case law of TAS presupposes the imposition of a disciplinary measure a sufficiently clear and unambiguous legal basis ( "a clear and unambigous legal basis for the sanction"). Legal certainty requires that the applicable provision - in this case, Article 2.06 UCLR - is sufficiently determined what considered the arbitral tribunal in the sequence and -for match-fixing, but not -bejahte for the accusation of false statements in the registration form.
A mistake or a misunderstanding, due to which the arbitral tribunal would have left a fairly substantial argument of the complainant disregarded, is not available in this context.

5.4. A hearing injury is not visible even in terms of the complainant's arguments for the design of the disciplinary measure. The tribunal has listed the corresponding argument in the contested decision expressly and the amount of the penalty scrutinized. By the complainant referred to the arbitration justification as "not understandable", it exerts only undue criticism of the contested decision, but not show a violation of the right to be heard.

. 6
The complainant alleges that the TAS before a violation of public policy.

6.1. He argues that the contested award was contrary to the matter of public policy pursuant to Art. 190 para. 2 lit. e IRPG belonging ne bis in idem (prohibition of double jeopardy). It had been pronounced against him for the same offense two penalties. The TAS of the contested decision imposed or confirmed punishment is contrary to the aforementioned principle and is therefore incompatible with public policy.


6.2.1. A violation of the procedural public policy front is a violation of fundamental and generally recognized principles of procedure, and failure to comply is the sense of justice in an intolerable contradiction, so that the decision as to the force in a constitutional state legal and value system utterly incompatible appears (BGE 140 III 278 E. 3.1; 136 III 345 E. 2.1 S. 347 f .; 132 III 389 E. 2.2.1 S. 392; 128 III 191 E. 4a p.194).

The arbitral tribunal violated the procedural public policy when the substantive legal force of a previous decision disregards when making its decision or if it is different in its final award of the view that it has expressed in a preliminary decision regarding a substantive preliminary (BGE 140 III 278 E. 3.1; 136 III 345 E. 2.1 p 348; with references).

The ne bis in idem principle also forms part of public policy within the meaning of Art. 190 para. 2 lit. e PILA
, The Federal Court has, however, left open whether this penal principle in disciplinary law of sport to be considered equally (judgment 4A_386 / 2010 from January 3, 2011 E. 9.3.1). The question does not need to be deepened in the present case, the TAS went himself of its applicability and examined the compatibility of the sanctions with this principle in detail. Therefore, the Federal Tribunal is limited to a review of the actual application of the principle mentioned by the arbitral tribunal (cf.. Judgment 4A_386 / 2010, supra, E. 9.3.1 a.e.).

6.2.2. The complainant in arbitration infringement of the principle ne bis in idem is seen that he had been excluded from the Champions League the playing season 2011/2012 with decision of the Turkish Football Federation dated 24 August 2011; he can not therefore be ruled out a second time from the UEFA competitions.

The tribunal was considering the time decreed by the Turkish federation TFF exclusion for the 2011/2012 season conclude later banned for more Game seasons not under a disciplinary procedure. It relied on Article 50 (3) of the UEFA Statutes (2010 edition), and Article 2.05 and 2.06 UCLR (2011/2012), which are as follows:

Article 50 (3) of the UEFA Statutes (2010):

"The admission to a UEFA competition of a Member Association or club Directly or Indirectly Involved in any activity Aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures. "

Article 2.05 UCLR (2011/2012):

"If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA Concludes to its comfortable satisfaction did a club has been Directly and / or Indirectly Involved, since the entry into force of Article 50 (3) of the UEFA Statutes , ie 27 April 2007, in any activity Aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare examined club ineligible to participate in the competition. search ineligibility is effective only for one football season. When taking its decision, UEFA can rely on, but is not bound by, a decision of a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court. UEFA can refrain from declaring a club ineligible to participate in the competition if UEFA is comfortably satisfied dass die impact of a decision taken in connection with the same factual circumstances by a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court has already had the effect to prevent did club from participating in a UEFA club competition. "
Article 2.06 UCLR (2011/2012):

"In addition to the administrative measure of declaring a club ineligible, as provided for in paragraph 2.05 the UEFA organ for the Administration of Justice can, if the circumstances so justify, so take disciplinary measures in accor dance with the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations."

The tribunal considered that Article 50 (3) of the UEFA Statutes provides for a two-stage process in conjunction with Article 2.05 and 2.06 UCLR: In a first stage will having regard to Article 2.05 UCLR an administrative measure ( "administrative measure") in the form of a one-year exclusion pronounced by the European Club competition. In a second stage, a disciplinary measure would be imposed, which know no maximum time period, and in addition to the administrative measure ( "In addition to the administrative measure [...]") could be adopted. The two types of match suspensions were distinguish clearly by the regulatory purpose of the provisions mentioned by first with immediate effect an exclusion would be imposed by the competition before the UEFA check the allegations of misconduct in detail. UEFA have a legitimate interest to exclude a football club from the competition immediately, without first initiating a comprehensive disciplinary proceedings against him. The administrative measure, the TAS, therefore constitutes not definitive, but merely a preliminary minimum sanction which seeks to protect the integrity of the concrete competition.

6.2.3. Applying the principle of ne bis in idem requires inter alia that the court in the first process must have granted the opportunity to assess the facts in all factual regular points (BGE 135 IV 6 E. 3.3; 119 Ib 311 E. 3c with hints ). To what extent this is true, after it but only went in the first process of the Turkish Football Federation to an administrative measure to protect the integrity of the concrete competition in a preliminary process in a timely manner, and not to a comprehensive disciplinary procedures for final determination of allegations of misconduct, does not light a , As the Supreme Court has laid down in a decision in the field of Sport Arbitration, the application of the double jeopardy prohibition obliges it an identity of the legal interest protected; Moreover, it pointed out that such a prohibition does not preclude that the same behavior in addition to criminal and civil, administrative or disciplinary consequences draws (judgment 4A_386 / 2011 of 3 January 2011 E. 9.3.2).

On the fact that the different procedures referred to in Article 2.05 and 2.06 UCLR also tracks each different purpose and extent various legal interests are protected, the applicant does not address, however. He contents himself rather with the indication that the arbitral tribunal in both methods of sanctions ( "sanctions") talks, which he fails to indicate that it is the one-year exclusion decreed by Article 2.05 is a decision, the same object as the having subsequently having to Article 2.06 pronounced disciplinary measure. Given the described two-stage process, each with different regulatory purpose is also not clear to what extent the Turkish federation TFF had been granted the option in the first process, finally to assess the facts in all factual regular points.
The TAS is no breach of the principle ne bis in idem reproach. The complaint of violation of public policy thus pushes into space.

. 7
The complaint is unfounded and must be dismissed, can be extent that the matter. the Appellant must the outcome of the procedure costs and compensate the Respondent (Art. 66 para. 1 and Art. 68 para. 2 BGG

Therefore, the Federal Court:

The appeal is rejected to the extent capable of appeal.

. 2
The judicial costs of CHF 30'000 .-- be borne by the Appellant.

. 3
The complainant shall pay to the Respondent for the federal judicial proceedings Fr. 35'000 .--.

. 4
This judgment shall be notified to the parties and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in writing.

Lausanne, October 16, 2014

On behalf of the First Civil Law Court of the Swiss Federal Court

The President: Klett

The Clerk: Leemann

Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision in German on Fenerbahce-UEFA Case Concerning The Match-Fixing Scandal

Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision in German on Fenerbahce-UEFA Case Concerning The Match-Fixing Scandal

Tribunal federal
Tribunale federale
Tribunal federal

{T 0/2}

Urteil vom 16. Oktober 2014 I. zivilrechtliche Abteilung

Bundesrichterin Klett, Präsidentin, Bundesrichter Kolly, Bundesrichterinnen Hohl, Kiss, Niquille, Gerichtsschreiber Leemann.

Fenerbahge Spor Kulübü,
vertreten durch Rechtsanwälte
Dr. Bernhard Berger und Dr. Andreas Güngerich,


Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA),
vertreten durch Rechtsanwalt Dr. Jean-Marc Reymond und Rechtsanwältin Delphine Rochat, Beschwerdegegnerin.
Internationales Schiedsgericht,

Beschwerde gegen den Schiedsentscheid des Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS) vom 11. April 2014.



A.a. Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (Beschwerdeführer) ist ein professioneller Fussballclub mit Sitz in Istanbul, Türkei. Er ist Mitglied des türkischen Fussballverbands (TFF).

Die Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA, Beschwerdegegnerin) mit Sitz in Nyon ist der europäische Fussballverband, dem auch der türkische Fussballverband angehört. Sie veranstaltet unter anderem die UEFA Champions League.

A.b. Am 21. und 26. Februar, am 6., 7. und 20. März sowie am 9. April 2011 wurden im Rahmen der türkischen "Süper Lig" verschiedene Fussballspiele ausgetragen, bei denen von Personen im Umfeld von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü Bestechungsgelder für den Matchverlust bezahlt worden sein sollen.

Am 14. April 2011 trat ein neues türkisches Gesetz (Nr. 6222) in Kraft, das einen besonderen Straftatbestand für Spielmanipulationen vorsieht.

Am 17. und 22. April sowie am 1. Mai 2011 fanden weitere Fussballspiele der "Süper Lig" statt, bei denen Personen im Umfeld von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü Geld bezahlt haben sollen, um die Spiele zu beeinflussen.

Am 5. Mai 2011 reichte Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü der UEFA das unterzeichnete Formular "UEFA Club Competitions 2011/2012 Admissions Criteria Form" ein, mit dem der Fussballclub bestätigte, seit 27. April 2007 weder direkt noch indirekt an Spielmanipulationen beteiligt gewesen zu sein.
Am 8., 15. und 22. Mai 2011 fanden weitere Fussballspiele der türkischen Süper Lig statt, bei denen von Personen mit Beziehungen zu Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü Bestechungsgelder an die gegnerische Mannschaft für den Spielverlust bezahlt worden sein sollen.

Am 22. Mai 2011 gewann Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü die Meisterschaft in der "Süper Lig" und qualifizierte sich damit gleichzeitig für die Gruppenspiele der UEFA Champions League der Spielsaison 2011/2012.

A.c. Am 3. Juli 2011 verhaftete die türkische Polizei 61 Personen im Rahmen einer weit angelegten Strafuntersuchung betreffend Spielmanipulationen im türkischen Fussballsport. Der Spielmanipulation verdächtigt wurden unter anderem der Präsident und Vizepräsident, zwei Vorstandsmitglieder, der Trainer und der Finanzdirektor von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü, dies im Zusammenhang mit verschiedenen Fussballspielen der Spielsaison 2010/2011.

Am 11. Juli 2011 forderte das TFF-Exekutivkomitee die Ethikkommission dazu auf, eine Untersuchung zu Spielmanipulationen im türkischen Fussballsport einzuleiten.

Am 20. Juli 2011 versorgte die türkische Staatsanwaltschaft die TFF-Ethikkommission mit Informationen und Beweismitteln im Zusammenhang mit dem eingeleiteten Strafverfahren.

A.d. Am 24. August 2011 informierte das TFF-Exekutivkomitee die UEFA über seinen Entscheid, den Fussballclub Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü diese Saison nicht in der Champions League antreten zu lassen.

Am 25. August 2011 wies die TFF-Schiedskommission eine von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü gegen den
Entscheid des TFF-Exekutivkomitees erhobene Berufung ab.

Auf Berufung von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü gegen den Entscheid der TFF-Schiedskommission vom 25. August 2011 hin wies das Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS) die Anträge um Erlass vorsorglicher Massnahmen mit Entscheiden vom 9. September und 3. November 2011 ab.

Am 2. Dezember 2011 erhob der türkische Staatsanwalt Anklage gegen verschiedene Personen, unter ihnen Funktionäre von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü.

Am 3. Januar 2012 leitete die TFF-Disziplinarkommission gegen Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü und weitere türkische Fussballclubs sowie zahlreiche natürliche Personen Disziplinarverfahren wegen Spielmanipulationen ein.

Am 25. April 2012 zog Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü seine Berufung an das TAS zurück, womit der Entscheid des türkischen Verbands, Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü für die Spielsaison 2011/2012 nicht in der Champions League antreten zu lassen, rechtskräftig wurde.

A.e. Am 26. April 2012 verabschiedete die TFF-Ethikkommission einen Untersuchungsbericht zu den Manipulationsvorwürfen bezüglich bestimmter Fussballspiele, unter anderem solchen, an denen Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü beteiligt war.

Mit Entscheid vom 6. Mai 2012 verhängte die TFF-Disziplinarkommission gegen ein Vorstandsmitglied von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü ein dreijähriges Verbot, gegen den Vizepräsidenten und den Trainer ein einjähriges Verbot, fussballbezogene Aktivitäten auszuüben.


B.a. Am 4. Juni 2012 erhielt die UEFA den Bericht der TFF-Ethikkommission vom 26. April 2012.

Mit Schreiben vom 7. Juni 2012 forderte der Generalsekretär der UEFA den Vorsitzenden der Kontroll- und Disziplinarkommission der UEFA auf, ein Disziplinarverfahren gegen Fenerbahce Spor
Kulübü einzuleiten.

Am 2. Juli 2012 entschied der High Criminal Court in Instanbul, dass unter der Führung von
B. , dem Präsidenten von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü, eine kriminelle Organisation gebildet
worden sei und dass sich Funktionäre von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü bei 13 Spielen der Saison 2010/2011 an Spielmanipulationen beteiligt hätten. Von den 93 Angeklagten wurden 48 verurteilt, unter ihnen

- B. , der Präsident von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (zweieinhalb Jahre Freiheitsstrafe für die
Bildung einer kriminellen Organisation, drei Jahre und neun Monate sowie TRY 1'312'500.-- für Spielmanipulationen);

- C. , Vizepräsident von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (ein Jahr und drei Monate Freiheitsstrafe
wegen Mitgliedschaft in einer kriminellen Organisation; ein Jahr, 10 Monate und 14 Tage wegen Spielmanipulationen);

- D. , Vorstandsmitglied von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (ein Jahr und sechs Monate
Freiheitsstrafe wegen Mitgliedschaft in einer kriminellen Organisation; ein Jahr, 25 [sic] Monate und 15 Tage sowie TRY 900'000.-- wegen Spielmanipulationen);

- E. , Vorstandsmitglied von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (ein Jahr und sechs Monate
Freiheitsstrafe wegen Mitgliedschaft in einer kriminellen Organisation; ein Jahr, ein Monat und 15 Tage sowie TRY 135'000.-- wegen Spielmanipulationen);

- F. , Trainer von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (ein Jahr und drei Monate Freiheitsstrafe wegen
Mitgliedschaft in einer kriminellen Organisation; 11 Monate und 7 Tage sowie TRY 15'626.-- wegen Spielmanipulationen);

- G. , Finanzdirektor von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü (ein Jahr und drei Monate Freiheitsstrafe
wegen Mitgliedschaft in einer kriminellen Organisation; ein Jahr und drei Monate sowie TRY 49'980.-
- Busse wegen Spielmanipulationen).
Am 31. Mai 2013 legte der UEFA-Disziplinarinspektor seinen Bericht über das bisherige Disziplinarverfahren vor. Am 20. Juni 2013 reichte Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü seine Stellungnahme dazu ein.

Mit Entscheid vom 22. Juni 2013 schloss die Kontroll- und Disziplinarkommission der UEFA Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü von der Teilnahme an den nächsten drei UEFA-Clubwettbewerben aus, für die sich der Fussballclub qualifizieren würde, wobei das dritte Jahr der Sperre zur Bewährung ausgesetzt wurde.

B.b. Mit Entscheid vom 10. Juli 2013 hob die UEFA-Berufungskammer den Entscheid der Kontroll-und Disziplinarkommission vom 22. Juni 2013 auf Berufung von Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü hin teilweise auf und schränkte die Sperre auf die nächsten zwei UEFA-Clubwettbewerbe ein.

B.c. Mit Eingabe vom 16. Juli 2013 focht Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü den Entscheid der UEFA-Berufungskammer vom 10. Juli 2013 beim TAS an und beantragte die aufschiebende Wirkung. Die UEFA widersetzte sich der Gewährung der aufschiebenden Wirkung nicht.

Am 18. Juli 2013 teilte Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü dem TAS unter anderem mit, dass sich die Parteien über den zeitlichen Verfahrensablauf geeinigt hätten.

Ebenfalls am 18. Juli 2013 bestätigte das TAS angesichts der zwischen den Parteien getroffenen Einigung die aufschiebende Wirkung. Ausserdem nahm es von der Einigung der Parteien auf einen beschleunigten Verfahrensablauf Kenntnis, wonach die Berufungsbegründung bis 26. Juli 2013 und die Berufungsantwort bis 9. August 2013 eingereicht, die mündliche Hauptverhandlung zwischen 21. und 23. August 2013 abgehalten und ein Entscheid bis 28. August 2013 gefällt werden soll.
Am 26. Juli 2013 reichte Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü die Berufungsbegründung ein, im Wesentlichen mit dem Antrag, die von der UEFA-Berufungskammer mit Entscheid vom 10. Juli 2013 verhängte Sperre sei aufzuheben; eventualiter sei der Entscheid vom 10. Juli 2013 aufzuheben und die Sache an die UEFA-Berufungskammer zurückzuweisen.

Am 9. August 2013 reichte die UEFA ihre Berufungsantwort ein, in der sie beantragte, die Berufung sei abzuweisen und der Entscheid der UEFA-Berufungskammer zu bestätigen.

Am 21. und 22. August 2013 fand in Lausanne die mündliche Hauptverhandlung statt. Dabei wurden insgesamt 20 von den Parteien bezeichnete Personen befragt; auf die Befragung von weiteren 13 Zeugen verzichtete Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü während der Verhandlung.

B.d. Mit Schiedsentscheid vom 28. August 2013 (mit Begründung zugestellt am 11. April 2014) wies das TAS die Berufung ab und bestätigte den angefochtenen Entscheid der UEFA-Berufungskammer vom 10. Juli 2013.

Mit Beschwerde in Zivilsachen beantragt Fenerbahce Spor Kulübü dem Bundesgericht, es sei der Schiedsentscheid des TAS vom 28. August 2013 aufzuheben.

Die Beschwerdegegnerin beantragt die Abweisung der Beschwerde, soweit darauf einzutreten sei. Das TAS beantragt in seiner Vernehmlassung die Abweisung der Beschwerde.

Der Beschwerdeführer hat dem Bundesgericht am 5. August 2014 eine Replik, die Beschwerdegegnerin am 26. August 2014 eine Duplik eingereicht.

Mit Verfügung vom 22. Juli 2014 wies das Bundesgericht das Gesuch des Beschwerdeführers um Erteilung der aufschiebenden Wirkung ab.

Mit Verfügung vom 1. September 2014 wies es das Gesuch um Wiedererwägung betreffend der nicht erteilten aufschiebenden Wirkung ab und bestätigte die Verfügung vom 22. Juli 2014.


Art. 54 Abs. 1 BGG
ergeht der Entscheid des Bundesgerichts in einer Amtssprache, in der Regel in jener des angefochtenen Entscheids. Wurde dieser in einer anderen Sprache redigiert, verwendet das Bundesgericht die von den Parteien gewählte Amtssprache. Der angefochtene Entscheid ist in englischer Sprache abgefasst. Da es sich dabei nicht um eine Amtssprache handelt und sich die Parteien vor Bundesgericht der deutschen Sprache bedienen, ergeht der Entscheid des Bundesgerichts auf Deutsch.

Im Bereich der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit ist die Beschwerde in Zivilsachen unter den Voraussetzungen der Art. 190-192 IPRG (SR 291) zulässig ( Art. 77 Abs. 1 lit. a BGG ).

2.1. Der Sitz des Schiedsgerichts befindet sich vorliegend in Lausanne. Der Beschwerdeführer hatte im massgebenden Zeitpunkt seinen Sitz ausserhalb der Schweiz ( Art. 176 Abs. 1 IPRG
). Da die Parteien die Geltung des 12. Kapitels des IPRG nicht ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen haben, gelangen die Bestimmungen dieses Kapitels zur Anwendung ( Art. 176 Abs. 2 IPRG ).

2.2. Zulässig sind allein die Rügen, die in Art. 190 Abs. 2 IPRG
abschliessend aufgezählt sind (BGE 134 III 186 E. 5 S. 187; 128 III 50 E. 1a S. 53; 127 III 279 E. 1a S. 282). Nach Art. 77 Abs. 3 BGG
prüft das Bundesgericht nur die Rügen, die in der Beschwerde vorgebracht und begründet worden sind; dies entspricht der in Art. 106 Abs. 2 BGG
für die Verletzung von Grundrechten und von kantonalem und interkantonalem Recht vorgesehenen Rügepflicht (BGE 134 III 186 E. 5 S. 187 mit Hinweis). Appellatorische Kritik ist unzulässig (BGE 134 III 565 E. 3.1 S. 567; 119 II 380 E. 3b S. 382).

2.3. Das Bundesgericht legt seinem Urteil den Sachverhalt zugrunde, den das Schiedsgericht festgestellt hat ( Art. 105 Abs. 1 BGG
). Dazu gehören sowohl die Feststellungen über den Lebenssachverhalt, der dem Streitgegenstand zugrunde liegt, als auch jene über den Ablauf des vorinstanzlichen Verfahrens, also die Feststellungen über den Prozesssachverhalt, zu dem namentlich die Anträge der Parteien, ihre Tatsachenbehauptungen, rechtlichen Erörterungen, Prozesserklärungen und Beweisvorbringen, der Inhalt einer Zeugenaussage, einer Expertise oder die Feststellungen anlässlich eines Augenscheins gehören (BGE 140 III 16 E. 1.3.1 mit Hinweisen).

Das Bundesgericht kann die Sachverhaltsfeststellung des Schiedsgerichts weder berichtigen noch ergänzen, selbst wenn diese offensichtlich unrichtig ist oder auf einer Rechtsverletzung im Sinne von Art. 95 BGG
beruht (vgl. Art. 77 Abs. 2 BGG , der die Anwendbarkeit von Art. 97 BGG
Art. 105 Abs. 2 BGG
ausschliesst). Allerdings kann das Bundesgericht die tatsächlichen Feststellungen des angefochtenen Schiedsentscheids überprüfen, wenn gegenüber diesen Sachverhaltsfeststellungen zulässige Rügen im Sinne von Art. 190 Abs. 2 IPRG
vorgebracht oder ausnahmsweise Noven berücksichtigt werden (BGE 138 III 29 E. 2.2.1 S. 34; 134 III 565 E. 3.1 S. 567; 133 III 139 E. 5 S. 141; je mit Hinweisen). Wer sich auf eine Ausnahme von der Bindung des Bundesgerichts an die tatsächlichen Feststellungen des Schiedsgerichts beruft und den Sachverhalt gestützt darauf berichtigt oder ergänzt wissen will, hat mit Aktenhinweisen darzulegen, dass entsprechende Sachbehauptungen bereits im schiedsgerichtlichen Verfahren prozesskonform aufgestellt worden sind (vgl. BGE 115 II 484 E. 2a S. 486; 111 II 471E. 1c S. 473; je mit Hinweisen).

2.4. Der Beschwerdeführer verkennt die Bindung des Bundesgerichts an die Feststellungen im angefochtenen Entscheid über den Prozesssachverhalt, wenn er seinen rechtlichen Vorbringen eine ausführliche Sachverhaltsdarstellung voranstellt, in der er die Hintergründe des Rechtsstreits und des Verfahrens aus eigener Sicht schildert und dabei teilweise von den tatsächlichen Feststellungen des Schiedsgerichts abweicht oder diese erweitert, ohne substantiiert Ausnahmen von der Sachverhaltsbindung geltend zu machen. Die entsprechenden Ausführungen haben unbeachtet zu bleiben.

Unbeachtlich sind auch die neu vorgebrachten Tatsachen ( Art. 99 Abs. 1 BGG
). So trägt der Beschwerdeführer etwa vor, in der Zwischenzeit habe der türkische Kassationshof von vier Urteilen gegen Vorstandsmitglieder zwei aufgehoben und zu erneuter Verhandlung in erster Instanz zurückgewiesen.

2.5. Die Beschwerde ist innert der Beschwerdefrist vollständig begründet einzureichen ( Art. 42 Abs. 1 BGG
). Kommt es zu einem zweiten Schriftenwechsel, darf die beschwerdeführende Partei die Replik nicht dazu verwenden, ihre Beschwerde zu ergänzen oder zu verbessern (vgl. BGE 132 I 42 E. 3.3.4). Die Replik ist nur zu Darlegungen zu verwenden, zu denen die Ausführungen in der Vernehmlassung eines anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten Anlass geben (vgl. BGE 135 I 19 E. 2.2).

Soweit der Beschwerdeführer in seiner Replik darüber hinausgeht, können seine Ausführungen nicht berücksichtigt werden.

Der Beschwerdeführer rügt, das TAS habe den Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung der Parteien verletzt (
Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. d IPRG ).

3.1. Er bringt vor, das TAS sei bei der Beurteilung der Berufung trotz des umfangreichen Prozessstoffs primär auf Raschheit bedacht gewesen und habe nur gerade sechs Wochen nach Eingang der Berufung und innert weniger als sechs Tagen nach Abschluss einer mehrtägigen Hauptverhandlung im Wege eines beschleunigten Verfahrens entschieden, anstatt die Streitsache an die UEFA zurückzuweisen. Damit habe das TAS die Ungleichbehandlung der Parteien, die ihren Ursprung in den Verfahren vor den Instanzen der UEFA gehabt habe, fortgeführt.

Die UEFA habe sich ab Sommer 2011 fast zwei Jahre Zeit genommen, bis sie dem Beschwerdeführer am 10. Juni 2013 schliesslich ihren Bericht über die erfolgten Untersuchungen zugestellt und ein Disziplinarverfahren eröffnet habe. Danach sei es "Schlag auf Schlag" gegangen, bis der Entscheid gefällt worden sei. Vor der UEFA-Kontroll- und Disziplinarkommission seien ihm gerade einmal 10 Tage Zeit für eine Stellungnahme eingeräumt worden, obwohl der massgebende Bericht wie auch die übrigen Prozessakten sehr umfangreich gewesen seien. Das anschliessende Verfahren vor der UEFA-Berufungskammer sei nichts anderes als eine Farce gewesen, habe es vom Eingang des Rechtsmittels bis zum Entscheid vom 10. Juli 2013 doch nur fünf Tage gedauert, wobei die Berufungskammer - trotz seines Protests - noch umfangreiche neue Beweisstücke der Beschwerdegegnerin zugelassen habe.
Eine umfassende Prüfung und wirksamen Rechtsschutz habe der Beschwerdeführer auch vor dem TAS nicht erhalten; die umfangreiche Streitigkeit sei nach Eingang seiner Berufung in gerade einmal sechs Wochen behandelt und abgewiesen worden; die mündliche Verhandlung sei auf zwei Tage beschränkt gewesen mit entsprechend wenigen Möglichkeiten für die Partei- und Zeugenbefragungen.

Dem beschleunigten Verfahren vor dem TAS habe der Beschwerdeführer nicht freiwillig zugestimmt. Grundlage des beschleunigten Verfahrens sei das Zulassungsformular (Admission Form) der UEFA gewesen, das ein Fussballclub unterzeichnen müsse, wenn er sich an UEFA-Wettbewerben beteiligen wolle. Er hätte einem beschleunigten Verfahren vor dem TAS nicht zugestimmt, wenn es eine Möglichkeit gegeben hätte, ohne Unterzeichnung des entsprechenden Formulars an den Wettbewerben der UEFA teilzunehmen; die entsprechende Erklärung könne ihm daher nicht entgegengehalten werden. Die vor den verbandsinternen Instanzen erfolgte Ungleichbehandlung habe sich im Schiedsverfahren vor dem TAS fortgesetzt. Die Beschwerdegegnerin habe rechtzeitig vor der Auslosung eine Klärung der Frage erzwingen wollen, wer an der Champions League der Saison 2013/2014 teilnehmen könne. Der Beschwerdeführer habe letztlich keine andere Wahl gehabt, als sich diesem Diktat der Beschwerdegegnerin zu unterziehen, um seine Möglichkeit zu wahren, doch noch an diesem Wettbewerb teilnehmen zu können. An der Durchführung des beschleunigten Verfahrens vor den verbandsinternen Organen und vor dem TAS habe überhaupt kein ernsthaftes Interesse bestanden; die Beschwerdegegnerin hätte ohne Weiteres ein geordnetes Beschwerdeverfahren durchführen und auch einem geordneten Ablauf des Schiedsverfahrens vor dem TAS zustimmen können. Mit ihrem einseitigen und unnötigen Beharren auf der Durchführung eines Eilverfahrens vor dem TAS habe die Beschwerdegegnerin gewollt in Kauf genommen, dass sich die Ungleichbehandlung der Parteien und damit die unzulässige Beschneidung der Verfahrensrechte vor dem TAS fortgesetzt hätten. Das TAS hätte das Recht auf Gleichbehandlung nur wahren können, indem es die Streitsache - wie beantragt - an die Beschwerdegegnerin zurückverwiesen hätte.


Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. d IPRG
lässt die Anfechtung allein wegen der zwingenden Verfahrensregeln gemäss Art. 182 Abs. 3 IPRG
zu. Danach muss das Schiedsgericht insbesondere den Anspruch der Parteien auf rechtliches Gehör wahren. Dieser entspricht - mit Ausnahme des Anspruchs auf Begründung - dem in Art. 29 Abs. 2 BV
gewährleisteten Verfassungsrecht (BGE 130 III 35 E. 5 S. 37 f.; 128 III 234 E. 4b S. 243; 127 III 576 E. 2c S. 578 f.). Die Rechtsprechung leitet daraus insbesondere das Recht der Parteien ab, sich über alle für das Urteil wesentlichen Tatsachen zu äussern, ihren Rechtsstandpunkt zu vertreten, ihre entscheidwesentlichen Sachvorbringen mit tauglichen sowie rechtzeitig und formrichtig offerierten Mitteln zu beweisen, sich an den Verhandlungen zu beteiligen und in die Akten Einsicht zu nehmen (BGE 130 III 35 E. 5 S. 38; 127 III 576 E. 2c S. 578 f.; je mit Hinweisen). Der Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung gebietet zudem, dass die Parteien während des gesamten Schiedsverfahrens gleich behandelt werden (vgl. BGE 133 III 139 E. 6.1 S. 143).

3.2.2. Die Partei, die sich durch eine Verweigerung des rechtlichen Gehörs oder einen anderen nach Art. 190 Abs. 2 IPRG

relevanten Verfahrensmangel für benachteiligt hält, verwirkt ihre Rügen, wenn sie diese nicht rechtzeitig im Schiedsverfahren vorbringt und nicht alle zumutbaren Anstrengungen unternimmt, um den Mangel - soweit möglich - zu beseitigen (BGE 130 III 66 E. 4.3 S. 75; 126 III 249 E. 3c S. 253 f.; 119 II 386 E. 1a S. 388; je mit Hinweisen). Die bundesgerichtliche Überprüfung des Schiedsspruchs auf Verfahrensverstösse ist mithin insoweit subsidiär, als die Parteien entsprechende Mängel zunächst beim Schiedsgericht so zu rügen haben, dass diese noch im laufenden Schiedsverfahren behoben werden können. Es widerspricht Treu und Glauben, einen Verfahrensmangel erst im Rahmen eines Rechtsmittelverfahrens zu rügen, obwohl im Schiedsverfahren die Möglichkeit bestanden hätte, dem Schiedsgericht die Gelegenheit zur Behebung des angeblichen Mangels zu geben (BGE 119 II 386 E. 1a S. 388). Treuwidrig und rechtsmissbräuchlich handelt insbesondere die Partei, die Rügegründe gleichsam in Reserve hält, um diese bei ungünstigem Prozessverlauf und voraussehbarem Prozessverlust nachzuschieben (vgl. BGE 136 III 605 E. 3.2.2 S. 609; 129 III 445 E. 3.1 S. 449; 126 III 249 E. 3c S. 254).


3.3.1. Soweit der Beschwerdeführer einen Verfahrensmangel vor Bundesgericht damit begründet, ihm sei während der zweitägigen Hauptverhandlung nicht ausreichend die Möglichkeit für Partei- und Zeugenbefragungen eingeräumt worden, ist er nicht zu hören. Es ist nicht ersichtlich, inwiefern er diesen angeblichen Mangel bereits im Schiedsverfahren vorgebracht hätte; im Gegenteil ergibt sich aus den Sachverhaltsfeststellungen im angefochtenen Entscheid, dass der Beschwerdeführer die Anzahl aufgerufener Zeugen von sich aus von zunächst 53 zwei Tage vor der mündlichen Verhandlung auf 35 und einen Tag vorher auf 32 herabsetzte, wobei er noch während der mündlichen Verhandlung auf die Anhörung von 13 weiteren angerufenen Zeugen verzichtete. Die Rüge ist verwirkt.

Auch mit seinen weiteren Ausführungen zeigt der Beschwerdeführer nicht auf, dass er eine Ungleichbehandlung durch das Schiedsgericht bereits während des Schiedsverfahrens gerügt hätte. Entgegen seinen Vorbringen vor Bundesgericht hat er weder in seiner Berufungsbegründung noch in der mündlichen Verhandlung auf eine Behebung des angeblichen Mangels im Schiedsverfahren hingewirkt. Vielmehr hat er sich in seiner Berufungsbegründung lediglich auf verschiedene Unzulänglichkeiten im verbandsinternen Verfahren berufen und dem TAS beantragt, die Streitsache sei an die UEFA-Berufungskammer zu neuer Beurteilung zurückzuweisen, falls das TAS seinem Hauptantrag, die verhängten Sanktionen aufzuheben, nicht folgen sollte. Kurz vor Abschluss der mündlichen Verhandlung erklärte der Beschwerdeführer, dem beschleunigten Verfahren nicht freiwillig zugestimmt zu haben, weshalb das Verfahren an die verbandsinternen Organe der UEFA zurückzuweisen sei. Dass er vor dem TAS mehr Zeit für weitere Stellungnahmen bzw. Beweiserhebungen oder eine Wiederholung bzw. Ergänzung bestimmter Verfahrensschritte beantragt, geschweige denn bereits im Schiedsverfahren eine Ungleichbehandlung gerügt hätte, zeigt der Beschwerdeführer nicht auf.

Damit hat er nicht alle zumutbaren Anstrengungen unternommen, um auf eine Behebung des angeblichen Mangels im laufenden Schiedsverfahren hinzuwirken. Er verwirkte damit das Recht, sich im Rechtsmittelverfahren vor Bundesgericht auf eine angebliche Ungleichbehandlung im Sinne von
Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. d IPRG
zu berufen. Auf die entsprechende Rüge ist ebenfalls nicht einzutreten.

3.3.2. Ohnehin zeigt der Beschwerdeführer nicht auf, inwiefern ihn das TAS im Schiedsverfahren ungleich behandelt hätte (vgl. BGE 133 III 139 E. 6.1 S. 143). Vielmehr kritisiert er auch vor Bundesgericht vorwiegend das verbandsinterne Verfahren oder das Verhalten der Beschwerdegegnerin und leitet aus der von ihm beanstandeten Unfreiwilligkeit des beschleunigten Verfahrens nicht etwa ab, das TAS hätte ein ordentliches Verfahren durchführen müssen, sondern erblickt eine Ungleichbehandlung vielmehr in der Abweisung seiner Berufungsanträge durch das Schiedsgericht. Damit macht er richtig besehen nicht geltend, der Gegenpartei sei im Rahmen des Schiedsverfahrens, in dem die Streitsache in tatsächlicher und rechtlicher Hinsicht neu beurteilt werden kann, verfahrensrechtlich etwas gewährt worden, was ihm verweigert wurde, sondern kritisiert in unzulässiger Weise den Inhalt des angefochtenen Schiedsspruchs.

Der Beschwerdeführer wirft dem Schiedsgericht vor, durch überraschende Rechtsanwendung seinen Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör ( Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. d IPRG ) verletzt zu haben.

4.1. Nach bundesgerichtlicher Rechtsprechung besteht kein verfassungsrechtlicher Anspruch der Parteien, zur rechtlichen Würdigung der durch sie in den Prozess eingeführten Tatsachen noch besonders angehört zu werden. Ebenso wenig folgt aus dem Gehörsanspruch, dass die Parteien vorgängig auf den für den Entscheid wesentlichen Sachverhalt hinzuweisen wären. Eine Ausnahme besteht namentlich, wenn ein Gericht seinen Entscheid mit einem Rechtsgrund zu begründen beabsichtigt, auf den sich die beteiligten Parteien nicht berufen haben und mit dessen Erheblichkeit sie vernünftigerweise nicht rechnen mussten (BGE 130 III 35E. 5 S. 39; 126 I 19 E. 2c/aa S. 22 und E. d/bb S. 24; 124 I 49 E. 3c S. 52).

4.2. Der Beschwerdeführer bringt vor, die UEFA-Berufungskammer habe ihn wegen insgesamt acht manipulierter Spiele und wegen unwahrer Angaben im Zulassungsformular zu einem (unbedingten) zweijährigen Ausschluss von den europäischen Clubwettbewerben verurteilt. Das TAS habe die Verurteilung wegen unwahrer Angaben im verwendeten Formular aufgehoben und zudem befunden, dass der Beschwerdeführer lediglich versucht habe, vier Spiele zu manipulieren. Dies habe jedoch zu keiner Strafreduktion geführt; stattdessen habe das TAS die zweijährige Sanktion bestätigt. Der Beschwerdeführer bezeichnet dieses Ergebnis als einen "ins Auge springenden Betriebsunfall" bei der Strafzumessung, zu dem es aufgrund eines im bisherigen Verfahren nie thematisierten Analogieschlusses mit den Strafzumessungsregelungen des World Anti-Doping Code (WADA-Code) gekommen sei. Das TAS habe den Parteien jedoch keine Möglichkeit gegeben, sich zu dieser "völlig überraschenden Analogie" zu äussern.

4.3. Entgegen dem, was der Beschwerdeführer anzunehmen scheint, hat das TAS die Strafzumessungskriterien nach Artikel 17 des UEFA-Disziplinarreglements (Ausgabe 2008) nicht etwa zugunsten derjenigen des WADA-Code ausser Acht gelassen, sondern hat sich bei der Strafzumessung durchaus auf diese Bestimmung gestützt. Ausserdem ist das Schiedsgericht ausdrücklich darauf eingegangen, weshalb es die verhängte Sanktion nicht herabsetzte, obwohl es im Unterschied zu den verbandsinternen Instanzen Spielmanipulationen "nur" in vier Fällen als erstellt erachtete. Insbesondere hielt das TAS gestützt auf Artikel 17 des UEFA-Disziplinarreglements eine zweijährige Sperre im konkreten Fall für eindeutig gerechtfertigt.
Das Schiedsgericht erachtete unter Berücksichtigung seiner eigenen Rechtsprechung, nach der für Spielmanipulationen Sanktionen zwischen einem und acht Jahren verhängt wurden, angesichts der besonderen Schwere des Falls im Vergleich mit bisher beurteilten Spielmanipulationen gar eine Sanktion am oberen Ende dieses Spektrums für angemessen, beliess es aber mit Hinweis auf den Grundsatz ultra petita - die Beschwerdegegnerin hatte auf eine Berufung verzichtet - bei der zweijährigen Sperre. Dem Hinweis des TAS darauf, dass in Dopingfällen vergleichbare Strafen ausgesprochen werden, womit grundsätzlich eine zweijährige Sperre zu verhängen wäre, die bei besonders schweren Vergehen höher und bei mildernden Umständen tiefer anzusetzen wäre, kam somit - entgegen der in der Beschwerde vertretenen Ansicht - keineswegs "die alles entscheidende Bedeutung für die Festlegung des Strafmasses" zu. Das TAS war unter diesen Umständen nicht verpflichtet, dem Beschwerdeführer eigens Gelegenheit einzuräumen, zu den Strafzumessungsregelungen des WADA-Code Stellung zu nehmen.

Eine den Gehörsanspruch verletzende überraschende Rechtsanwendung liegt nicht vor.

Der Beschwerdeführer wirft dem TAS vor, in Verletzung des Gehörsanspruchs verschiedene seiner entscheiderheblichen Vorbringen nicht geprüft zu haben.

5.1. Der Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör in einem kontradiktorischen Verfahren gemäss
Art. 182 Abs. 3 und
Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. d IPRG
umfasst nach ständiger Rechtsprechung nicht auch den Anspruch auf Begründung eines internationalen Schiedsentscheids (BGE 134 III 186E. 6.1 mit Hinweisen). Dennoch ergibt sich daraus eine minimale Pflicht der Schiedsrichter, die entscheiderheblichen Fragen zu prüfen und zu behandeln. Diese Pflicht verletzt das Schiedsgericht, wenn es aufgrund eines Versehens oder eines Missverständnisses rechtserhebliche Behauptungen, Argumente, Beweise oder Beweisanträge einer Partei unberücksichtigt lässt. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass sich das Schiedsgericht ausdrücklich mit jedem einzelnen Vorbringen der Parteien auseinandersetzen muss (BGE 133 III 235 E. 5.2 mit Hinweisen).


5.2.1. Der Beschwerdeführer wirft dem Schiedsgericht zunächst vor, es habe bei der Beurteilung der Kompetenz der UEFA zur Verhängung von Sanktionen wegen Spielmanipulationen einzelne seiner Vorbringen vollständig ausser Acht gelassen. So habe er geltend gemacht, dass er im Zeitpunkt der Austragung einiger der umstrittenen Spiele Artikel 2.06 der Regulations of the UEFA Champions League (UCLR) noch gar nicht als verbindlich anerkannt habe. Dazu habe sich das Schiedsgericht ebenso wenig geäussert wie zu seinem Argument, dass nach der Rechtsprechung des TAS die Disziplinarregelungen der UEFA nach deren Wortlaut und Regelungszusammenhang objektiv auszulegen seien. Auch auf sein Argument, wonach die Auslegung von Verbandsregelungen -insbesondere Disziplinarregelungen - im Zweifel zu Lasten des Verwenders zu erfolgen habe, sei das TAS mit keinem Wort eingegangen. Zudem seien seine Vorbringen zur Auslegung und Bedeutung des von der Beschwerdegegnerin in der mündlichen Verhandlung vorgelegten Rundschreibens Nr. 24/2013 der UEFA nicht geprüft und gewürdigt worden. Hätte das Schiedsgericht seine entscheiderheblichen Argumente zur fehlenden Strafkompetenz der UEFA geprüft, so der Beschwerdeführer, hätte es seine Berufung gutheissen müssen.

5.2.2. Das Schiedsgericht führt die Problematik der Zuständigkeit der UEFA zur Durchführung eines Disziplinarverfahrens im angefochtenen Entscheid als eine der zu beurteilenden Hauptfragen auf. Es fasste den Standpunkt des Beschwerdeführers hierzu dahingehend zusammen, dass sich die bestrittenen Vorwürfe der Spielmanipulation auf Meisterschaftsspiele der Saison 2010/2011 bezögen und somit nach den massgebenden Verbandsbestimmungen nicht in die Disziplinarkompetenz der UEFA fielen.

Das Schiedsgericht prüfte in der Folge die Kompetenz der UEFA zur Ahndung von Spielmanipulationen eingehend. Dabei wies es unter anderem ausdrücklich auf das Argument des Beschwerdeführers hin, wonach der UEFA im Zeitpunkt des ihm vorgeworfenen Verhaltens nach den damals anwendbaren Verbandsregeln die erforderliche Disziplinarkompetenz gefehlt habe; eine solche sei nach Ansicht des Beschwerdeführers erst nachträglich eingeführt worden, weshalb sich die Zuständigkeit für die erfolgte Bestrafung weder auf Artikel 50 (3) der UEFA-Statuten noch auf Artikel 2.05 bzw. 2.06 UCLR oder Artikel 5 des Disziplinarreglements stützen lasse. Das Schiedsgericht prüfte die Problematik der rechtlichen Grundlage für eine Sanktionierung der fraglichen Spielmanipulationen durch die UEFA ausführlich, indem es die erwähnten Bestimmungen auslegte und dabei auch deren Anwendbarkeit in zeitlicher Hinsicht beurteilte. Dabei äusserte es sich unter anderem zur Auslegung und Bedeutung des Rundschreibens Nr. 24/2013.

Dem Schiedsgericht kann unter diesen Umständen nicht vorgeworfen werden, es habe seine minimale Pflicht verletzt, die entscheiderheblichen Fragen zu prüfen und zu behandeln (vgl. BGE 133 III 235 E. 5.2 S. 248 mit Hinweisen). Angesichts der ausführlichen Begründung im angefochtenen Entscheid ist davon auszugehen, dass es die vom Beschwerdeführer ins Feld geführten Argumente zumindest sinngemäss verworfen hat. Das Schiedsgericht hat den Gehörsanspruch des Beschwerdeführers nicht verletzt, indem es sich nicht mit jedem einzelnen seiner Vorbringen zur Anwendbarkeit von Artikel 2.06 UCLR, zur angeblich massgebenden Auslegungsmethode bei Verbandsregelungen oder zur Auslegung und Bedeutung des Rundschreibens Nr. 24/2013 ausdrücklich auseinandersetzte.

5.3. Der Beschwerdeführer rügt weiter, er habe im Schiedsverfahren vorgetragen, dass die von der Beschwerdegegnerin ausgesprochene Sanktion gegen den im Strafrecht geltenden Grundsatz nulla poena sine lege verstosse. Das Schiedsgericht setze sich in seinem Entscheid mit diesem Einwand jedoch in keiner Weise auseinander. Einzelne Überschriften ("[...] and were the sanctions imposed in accordance with the legality principle?" oder "Is there a sufficient legal basis for the disciplinary measure?") liessen an sich darauf schliessen, dass diese Frage inhaltlich abgehandelt werden sollte, was jedoch nicht zutreffe.

Der in der Beschwerde erhobene - jedoch nicht weiter begründete - Vorwurf, die erwähnten Überschriften entpuppten sich als "reiner Etikettenschwindel", ist nicht nachvollziehbar. Der Beschwerdeführer stellt selbst nicht in Abrede, dass das Schiedsgericht sein Argument, wonach die für die verhängte Sanktion herangezogenen Verbandsbestimmungen die Anforderungen des Legalitätsprinzips ( nulla poena sine lege scripta et certa ) in der Entscheidbegründung ausdrücklich aufführt. Es leitet seine Ausführungen zum Legalitätsprinzip unter der Überschrift "Is there a sufficient legal basis for the disciplinary measure?" damit ein, nach schweizerischem Recht und ständiger Rechtsprechung des TAS setze die Verhängung einer Disziplinarmassnahme eine hinreichend klare und unzweideutige Rechtsgrundlage ("a clear and unambigous legal basis for the sanction") voraus. Die Rechtssicherheit verlange, dass die anwendbare Bestimmung - im konkreten Fall Artikel 2.06 UCLR - hinreichend bestimmt sei, was das Schiedsgericht in der Folge prüfte und -für Spielmanipulationen, nicht jedoch für den Vorwurf unwahrer Angaben im Zulassungsformular -bejahte.
Ein Versehen oder ein Missverständnis, aufgrund dessen das Schiedsgericht ein rechtserhebliches Argument des Beschwerdeführers unberücksichtigt gelassen hätte, liegt auch in diesem Zusammenhang nicht vor.

5.4. Eine Gehörsverletzung ist auch hinsichtlich der Argumente des Beschwerdeführers zur Bemessung der Disziplinarmassnahme nicht erkennbar. Das Schiedsgericht hat die entsprechenden Vorbringen im angefochtenen Entscheid ausdrücklich aufgeführt und die Höhe der Sanktion eingehend geprüft. Indem der Beschwerdeführer die schiedsgerichtliche Begründung als "nicht nachvollziehbar" bezeichnet, übt er lediglich unzulässige Kritik am angefochtenen Entscheid, ohne jedoch eine Verletzung des Gehörsanspruchs aufzuzeigen.

Der Beschwerdeführer wirft dem TAS eine Verletzung des Ordre public vor.

6.1. Er bringt vor, der angefochtene Schiedsspruch verstosse gegen den zum Ordre public gemäss Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. e IRPG gehörenden Grundsatz ne bis in idem (Verbot der doppelten Strafverfolgung). Es seien zwei Strafen wegen der gleichen Tat gegen ihn ausgesprochen worden. Die vom TAS mit dem angefochtenen Entscheid verhängte bzw. bestätigte Strafe verstosse gegen den erwähnten Grundsatz und sei daher mit dem Ordre public unvereinbar.


6.2.1. Ein Verstoss gegen den verfahrensrechtlichen Ordre public liegt vor bei einer Verletzung fundamentaler und allgemein anerkannter Verfahrensgrundsätze, deren Nichtbeachtung zum Rechtsempfinden in einem unerträglichen Widerspruch steht, so dass die Entscheidung als mit der in einem Rechtsstaat geltenden Rechts- und Wertordnung schlechterdings unvereinbar erscheint (BGE 140 III 278 E. 3.1; 136 III 345 E. 2.1 S. 347 f.; 132 III 389 E. 2.2.1 S. 392; 128 III 191 E. 4a S. 194).

Das Schiedsgericht verletzt den verfahrensrechtlichen Ordre public, wenn es bei seinem Entscheid die materielle Rechtskraft eines früheren Entscheids unbeachtet lässt oder wenn es in seinem Endentscheid von der Auffassung abweicht, die es in einem Vorentscheid hinsichtlich einer materiellen Vorfrage geäussert hat (BGE 140 III 278 E. 3.1; 136 III 345 E. 2.1 S. 348; je mit Hinweisen).

Der Grundsatz ne bis in idem gehört grundsätzlich ebenfalls zum Ordre public im Sinne von Art. 190 Abs. 2 lit. e IPRG
. Das Bundesgericht hat allerdings offengelassen, ob dieser strafrechtliche Grundsatz im Disziplinarrecht des Sports gleichermassen zu berücksichtigen ist (Urteil 4A_386/2010 vom 3. Januar 2011 E. 9.3.1). Die Frage braucht auch im vorliegenden Verfahren nicht vertieft zu werden, ging das TAS doch selbst von dessen Anwendbarkeit aus und prüfte die Vereinbarkeit der Sanktion mit diesem Prinzip eingehend. Das Bundesgericht beschränkt sich daher auf eine Überprüfung der konkreten Anwendung des erwähnten Grundsatzes durch das Schiedsgericht (vgl. Urteil 4A_386/2010, a.a.O., E. 9.3.1 a.E.).

6.2.2. Der Beschwerdeführer hatte im Schiedsverfahren eine Verletzung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem darin erblickt, dass er bereits mit Entscheid des türkischen Fussballverbands vom 24. August 2011 von der Champions League der Spielsaison 2011/2012 ausgeschlossen worden war; er könne daher nicht ein zweites Mal von den Wettbewerben der UEFA ausgeschlossen werden.

Das Schiedsgericht erwog, der damals vom türkischen Verband TFF verfügte Ausschluss für die Saison 2011/2012 schliesse eine spätere Sperre für weitere Spielsaisons im Rahmen eines Disziplinarverfahrens nicht aus. Es stützte sich dabei auf Artikel 50 (3) der UEFA-Statuten (Ausgabe 2010) sowie Artikel 2.05 und 2.06 UCLR (2011/2012), die wie folgt lauten:

Artikel 50 (3) der UEFA-Statuten (2010) :

"The admission to a UEFA competition of a Member Association or club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures."

Artikel 2.05 UCLR (2011/2012) :

"If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry into force of Article 50 (3) of the UEFA Statutes, i.e. 27 April 2007, in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare such club ineligible to participate in the competition. Such ineligibility is effective only for one football season. When taking its decision, UEFA can rely on, but is not bound by, a decision of a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court. UEFA can refrain from declaring a club ineligible to participate in the competition if UEFA is comfortably satisfied that the impact of a decision taken in connection with the same factual circumstances by a national or international sporting body, arbitral tribunal or state court has already had the effect to prevent that club from participating in a UEFA club competition."
Artikel 2.06 UCLR (2011/2012) :

"In addition to the administrative measure of declaring a club ineligible, as provided for in paragraph 2.05, the UEFA Organs for the Administration of Justice can, if the circumstances so justify, also take disciplinary measures in accordance with the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations."

Das Schiedsgericht erwog, dass Artikel 50 (3) der UEFA-Statuten in Verbindung mit Artikel 2.05 und 2.06 UCLR ein zweistufiges Verfahren vorsehe: In einer ersten Stufe werde gestützt auf Artikel 2.05 UCLR eine Administrativmassnahme ("administrative measure") in Form eines einjährigen Ausschlusses vom europäischen Clubwettbewerb ausgesprochen. In einer zweiten Stufe werde eine Disziplinarmassnahme verhängt, die keine zeitliche Höchstdauer kenne, und zusätzlich zur Administrativmassnahme ( "In addition to the administrative measure [...]" ) erlassen werden könne. Die beiden Arten von Spielsperren seien nach dem Regelungszweck der erwähnten Bestimmungen klar auseinanderzuhalten, indem zunächst mit sofortiger Wirkung ein Ausschluss vom Wettbewerb verhängt werde, bevor die UEFA die vorgeworfenen Verfehlungen eingehend prüfe. Die UEFA habe ein schutzwürdiges Interesse, einen Fussballclub unverzüglich vom Wettbewerb auszuschliessen, ohne zunächst ein umfangreiches Disziplinarverfahren gegen ihn einzuleiten. Die Administrativmassnahme, so das TAS, stelle somit nicht die endgültige, sondern lediglich eine vorläufige minimale Sanktion dar, die den Schutz der Integrität des konkreten Wettkampfs bezwecke.

6.2.3. Die Anwendung des Prinzips ne bis in idem setzt unter anderem voraus, dass dem Gericht im ersten Verfahren die Möglichkeit zugestanden haben muss, den Sachverhalt unter allen tatbestandsmässigen Punkten zu würdigen (BGE 135 IV 6 E. 3.3; 119 Ib 311 E. 3c mit Hinweisen). Inwiefern dies zutreffen soll, nachdem es im ersten Verfahren des türkischen Fussballverbands doch lediglich um eine Administrativmassnahme ging, um die Integrität des konkreten Wettkampfs in einem vorläufigen Verfahren zeitgerecht zu schützen, und nicht um ein umfassendes Disziplinarverfahren zur abschliessenden Beurteilung der vorgeworfenen Verfehlungen, leuchtet nicht ein. Wie das Bundesgericht in einem Entscheid im Bereich der Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit festgehalten hat, setzt die Anwendung des Doppelbestrafungsverbots unter anderem eine Identität der geschützten Rechtsgüter voraus; zudem wies es darauf hin, dass dieses Verbot nicht ausschliesst, dass dasselbe Verhalten neben strafrechtlichen auch zivilrechtliche, verwaltungsrechtliche oder disziplinarische Folgen nach sich zieht (Urteil 4A_386/2011 vom 3. Januar 2011 E. 9.3.2).

Auf den Umstand, dass mit den unterschiedlichen Verfahren nach Artikel 2.05 und 2.06 UCLR auch je verschiedene Zwecke verfolgt und insoweit verschiedene Rechtsgüter geschützt werden, geht der Beschwerdeführer allerdings nicht ein. Er begnügt sich vielmehr mit dem Hinweis darauf, dass das Schiedsgericht bei beiden Verfahren von Sanktionen ("sanctions") spricht, womit er nicht aufzeigt, dass es sich bei dem nach Artikel 2.05 verfügten einjährigen Ausschluss um einen Entscheid handelt, der denselben Gegenstand wie die nachfolgend gestützt auf Artikel 2.06 ausgesprochene Disziplinarmassnahme aufweist. Angesichts des geschilderten zweistufigen Verfahrens mit je unterschiedlichem Regelungszweck ist auch nicht erkennbar, inwiefern dem türkischen Verband TFF im ersten Verfahren bereits die Möglichkeit zugestanden hätte, den Sachverhalt abschliessend unter allen tatbestandsmässigen Punkten zu würdigen.
Dem TAS ist keine Verletzung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem vorzuwerfen. Die Rüge der Verletzung des Ordre public stösst somit ins Leere.

Die Beschwerde erweist sich als unbegründet und ist abzuweisen, soweit darauf eingetreten werden kann. Dem Ausgang des Verfahrens entsprechend wird der Beschwerdeführer kosten- und entschädigungspflichtig ( Art. 66 Abs. 1 sowie Art. 68 Abs. 2 BGG

Demnach erkennt das Bundesgericht:

Die Beschwerde wird abgewiesen, soweit darauf einzutreten ist.

Die Gerichtskosten von Fr. 30'000.-- werden dem Beschwerdeführer auferlegt.

Der Beschwerdeführer hat die Beschwerdegegnerin für das bundesgerichtliche Verfahren mit Fr. 35'000.-- zu entschädigen.

Dieses Urteil wird den Parteien und dem Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS) schriftlich mitgeteilt.

Lausanne, 16. Oktober 2014

Im Namen der I. zivilrechtlichen Abteilung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts

Die Präsidentin: Klett

Der Gerichtsschreiber: Leemann

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Pannomial Fragments

Pannomial Fragments, by Jeremy Bentham


BY a Pannomion, understand on this occasion an all-comprehensive collection of law,—that is to say, of rules expressive of the will or wills of some person or persons belonging to the community, or say society in question, with whose will in so far as known, or guessed at, all other members of that same community in question, whether from habit or otherwise, are regarded as disposed to act in compliance.
In the formation of such a work, the sole proper all-comprehensive end should be the greatest happiness of the whole community, governors and governed together,—the greatest-happiness principle should be the fundamental principle.
The next specific principle is the happiness-numeration principle.
Rule: In case of collision and contest, happiness of each party being equal, prefer the happiness of the greater to that of the lesser number.
Maximizing universal security; — securing the existence of, and sufficiency of, the matter of subsistence for all the members of the com-munity;—maximizing the quantity of the matter of abundance in all its shapes; — securing the nearest approximation to absolute equality in the distribution of the matter of abundance, and the other modifications of the matter of property ; that is to say, the nearest approximation consistent with universal security, as above, for subsistence and maximization of the matter of abundance: — by these denominations, or for shortness, by the several words security, subsistence, abundance, and equality, may be characterized the several specific ends, which in the character of means stand next in subordination to the all embracing end — the greatest happiness of the greatest number of the individuals be-longing to the community in question.
The following are the branches of the pannomion, to which the ends immediately subordinate to the greatest-happiness principle respectively correspond: —
To constitutional law, the axioms and principles applying to equality.
To penal law, the axioms and principles applying to security; viz. as to—1. Person; 2. Reputation; 3. Property; 4. Condition in life.
The principle presiding over that branch of the penal code, which is employed in the en-deavour to arrest, or apply remedy to offences considered as being and being intended to be productive of suffering to one party, without producing enjoyment, otherwise than from the contemplation of such suffering, to the other, is the positive-pain-preventing principle.
Rule: Let not any one produce pain on the part of any other, for no other purpose than the pleasure derived from the contemplation of that same pain.
The persons for the regulation of whose conduct the positive-pain-preventing principle applies are —
1. The subject citizens, taken at large.
2. The sovereign, in respect of the quantity, and thence the quality of the subsequentially preventive, or say punitive, remedy applied by him against any offence.
To civil law, more particularly, apply the axioms relating to security as to property. Sole principle — the disappointment-preventing principle.
Rule applying to the aggregate, composed of the several sources of positive good or happiness, elements of prosperity, objects as they thus are of general desire: Among a number of persons, competitors actually or eventually possible, for the benefit or source of happiness in question, exceptions excepted, give it to that one in whose breast the greatest quantity of pain of disappointment will have place, in the event of his not having the thing thenceforward in his possession, or say, at his command.
The exception is when, by any different disposition, happiness in greater quantity, probability taken into account, will be produced.
Of any such exception the existence ought not to be assumed: if it exist, the proof of its existence lies upon him by whom its existence is asserted.
To political economy apply the axioms and principles relating to subsistence and abundance. To political economy— that is to say, to those portions of the penal and civil codes in the rationale of which considerations suggested by the art and science of political economy are applicable and have place: considerations over and above and independent of the sensations produced by loss and gain.
By axioms of moral and political pathology, understand so many general propositions, by each of which statement is made of the pleasure or pain (chiefly of the pain) produced by the several sorts of evils, which are the result of human agency on the part of the several individuals respectively affected by them; to wit, by means of the influence exercised by them on the quantity or degree in which the benefits expressed by the fore-mentioned all important words, are by the respective parties, agents and patients, enjoyed, or the opposite burthens constituted by the absence of them endured.
Of these propositions, it will be observed that they divide themselves into groups ; — one group being relative to security, another to subsistence, a third to abundance, the fourth and last to equality: the first bringing to view the enjoyment derived from the un-disturbed possession of security at large — security in the most comprehensive application made of the word, contrasted with the enjoyment producible by the breach of it, — the second group bringing to view the subject of subsistence; — the third group bringing to view the subject of abundance, — and the fourth group bringing to view the subject of equality, and stating the evil consequence of any legislative arrangement by which a defalcation from the maximum of practicable equality is effected.
In each of the axioms, the antagonizing, or say competing, interests of two parties are conjointly brought to view: — in those which relate to security, these parties are, the maleficent agent, or say wrongdoer, and the patient wronged:—in those which relate to subsistence, abundance, and equality, they are the parties whose interests stand in com-petition, no blame being supposed to have place on either side. By the legislator, preference should be given to that interest by preference to which the happiness of the greatest number will be most augmented.
To the first of the three stages of the progress made in society by the good or evil flowing from a human act, belong the effects of which indication is given in and announced by these same four groups of axioms.
The principles which form the groundwork of the here proposed system, correspond to the above-mentioned specific ends, immediately subordinate to the all-comprehensive end, expressed for shortness by the greatest-happiness principle,—and have their foundation in observations on the pathology of the human mind as expressed in the above-mentioned propositions, to which, in consideration of their supposed incontrovertibility and extensive applicability, have been given, for distinction sake, the name of axioms.
As to these principles, the names by which expression is given to them have for their object and purpose conciseness — the conveying, by means of these several compound substantives, a conception of the several groups of pathological effects in a manner more concise, and thence more commodious, than by a repetition made each time of the several groups of axioms to which they cor-respond, and which they are employed to recall to mind.
Correspondent to the axioms having reference to security, will be found the principles following: —
1. Principle correspondent to security, and the axioms thereto belonging, is the security-providing principle.
Of the security-providing principle, the following modifications may be brought to view, corresponding to the several object* respecting which security requires to be af-forded : —
I. The objects for, or say in respect of which, security is endeavoured, are these —
1. Person: the person of individuals on the occasion of which body and mind require to be distinguished.
2. Reputation: the reputation of individuals or classes, or say the degree of estimation in which they are respectively held.
3. Property: the masses of the matter of wealth respectively belonging to them, and possessed by them in the shape of capital, or in the shape of income.
4. Power: the portions of power respectively belonging to them, for whose sake so-ever, or say to whose benefit so-ever exercisable, whether for the sake and benefit of the individual power-holder himself—or for the sake of other persons, one or more, in any number; in which case the power is styled a trust, and the power-holder a trustee, and the person or persons for whose benefit it is exercised, or designed to be exercised, entitled benefitee, and the person or persons by whom the trust was created a trustor.
5. Rank: or say factitious reputation or estimation, — the source of factitious reputation or estimation put into the possession of the individual by a series of delusions operating on the imagination.
6. Condition in life, in so far as beneficial: the aggregate benefits included in it will be found composed of the above objects, two or more of them.
N. B. The four last-mentioned objects may, for conciseness sake, be spoken of as so many modifications of the matter of prosperity.
7. Miscellaneous rights: including exemptions from burthensome obligations.
2. The maleficent acts, or say offences, against which the endeavour is used to apply the appropriate punitive and other remedies.
3. The contingently maleficent agents, against whose maleficent acts the endeavour will be used to employ the several remedial applications. These may be —

1. External, or say foreign governments and subjects, considered as liable to become adversaries. Code in which provision is made against evil from that source, the Constitutional. Ch. &c. Defensive Force — sub-departments of the administration department, those of the army and the navy ministers.
2. Internal; viz. fellow-citizens; as distinguished into—1. Fellow-citizens at large, or say non-functionaries; 2. Functionaries considered in respect of the evil producible by them in such their several capacities.
4. The several classes of persons to whom, by the several arrangements employed, the security is endeavoured to be afforded. These may be distinguished into — (1.) Citizens of the state ir. question; distinguished into — 1. Persons considered in their individual capacities: correspondent offences — private offences. 2. Persons considered in classes: correspondent offences—semi-public offences. 3. Functionaries as such considered in the aggregate: correspondent offences—public offences, such as are purely public in contra-distinction to such as are private-public; of-fences affecting their individual capacity, but constituted public offences by the indefinable multitude of the individuals liable to be affected. (2.) Foreigners with reference to the state in question; — governments and subjects as above included.
A modification of the security-providing principle, applying to security in respect of all modifications of the matter of property, is the disappointment-preventing principle. The use of it is to convey intimation of the reason for whatever arrangements come to be made for affording security in respect of property and the other modifications of the matter of prosperity, considered with a view to the interest of the individual possessor. In the aggregate of these are contained all the security-requiring objects, as above, with the exception of person.
II. Subsistence-securing principle: correspondent subordinate end in view — subsistence. The use of it is to convey intimation of the reason for whatever arrangements come to be made for the purpose of securing, for the use of the community in question, a sufficient quantity of the matter of subsistence.
III. Abundance-maximizing principle: the use of it is to convey intimation of the reasons for whatever arrangements may come to be made in contemplation of their conduciveness to the accomplishment of that end.
IV. Equality-maximizing, or say, more properly, inequality - minimizing principle: the use of it is to convey intimation of the reasons for whatever arrangements come to be made, in contemplation of their conduciveness to this end.

SUBJECTS of consideration on the present occasion are the following: — Pleasures and pains—happiness and unhappiness—good and evil—ends and means—rules and principles — axioms of pathology, physical, and mental —or say psychological—observation and experiment. Of these, many are mutually correlative, — all are intimately connected with, and give and receive explanation to and from each other.
Happiness is a word employed to denote the sum of the pleasures experienced during that quantity of time which is under consideration, deduction made or not made of the quantity of pain experienced during that same quantity of time.
Unhappiness is a word employed to denote the sum of pains experienced during the quantity of time which is under consideration, deduction made or not made of the quantity of pleasure experienced during that same quantity of time.
Good is a word employed to denote either pleasure, or exemption from pain — and the cause efficient, and more or less effective, of either.
Evil is a word employed to denote either pain or loss of pleasure, or a cause efficient, and more or less effective, of either.
In regard to good and evil, consider —
I. Their condition or import as to existence
and non-existence.
Their existential character, or say character or mode of designation in regard to existence, or say logical character: —this is either positive or negative.
Positive good, is that which assumes not the existence of evil, and which accordingly might have place if there were no such thing as evil.
Negative good, is that which is constituted by the non-existence of evil on the occasion in question.
Positive evil, is that which assumes not the existence of good, and which accordingly might have place, if there were no such thing as good.
II. In regard to each, their quality.
By good, understand either pleasure, or the absence—or say, on the occasion in question, the non-existence — of pain. Pleasure is positive good; absence of pain—negative good.
By evil, understand either pain, or the absence — or say, on the occasion in question, the non-existence—of pleasure. Pain is positive evil; absence of pleasure—if arising from loss — negative evil.
III. Their relation in respect of causality.
Understand by good, either actual pleasure,
or absence of pain, or anything considered as the cause of pleasure, or the absence of pain.
Understand by evil, either actual pain, or absence of pleasure, or anything considered as the cause of pain or of the absence of pleasure.
IV. Their quantity, in respect of— 1. Intensity; 2. Duration; 3. Extent.
V. Their productiveness — or say fecundity— 1. Direct; 2. Inverse.
VI. Part taken by human action in the
production of them.
1. Wish, or say desire; 2. Direction to action in consequence—or say, in pursuance of such wish.
End is a word employed to denote a good, the prospect of eventually experiencing which, operates as a motive tending to produce at the hands of any sensitive being, some good which is an object of human desire and hope.
Means is a word employed to denote any substance, state of things, or matter, considered as contributing to the attainment of the good, which on that same occasion is regarded as an end.
Pleasures and exemptions from pains, with their respective correlatives, happiness and exemption from unhappiness, are the ultimate ends of action.
As between good and evil, good alone is an ultimate end of the action of a sensitive being.
Good and evil, both are means in their nature capable of being made conducive to the attainment of the ultimate end—the net maximum of happiness; and accordingly by men in general, and by men in the situation of legislators in particular, are employed in that view, and for that purpose.
Of good or evil, one and the same portion is capable of acting, on one and the same occasion, in the character of an end, and in that of a means: — of a means in relation to some antecedent end or state of things—of an end in relation to some eventually subsequent state of things.
Remedy, in all its shapes, is an instrument having for its use the exclusion of wrong in all its several shapes — or say, the exclusion of maleficence in all its several shapes.
Of remedy in every shape, the application made is attended with and productive of burthen.
The application of remedy, instead of excluding wrong, is productive of wrong, if and in so for as it is productive of burthen out-weighing the benefit.
In this way may effects and causes be seen linked together, as it were, in a chain composed of links in indefinite number, and, taken in the aggregate, of correspondent length.
So much for the matter of good, being that the production of which is, or at least ought to be the object, or say end in view, of everything which passes under the denomination of law — or a law: — and so much for good and evil, —both of them employed as means, and the only means employable, for the attainment of that end.
But what is a law, and what are laws themselves? Before this is explained, must be brought to view that species of matter which on each occasion is occupied in passing judgment on the aptitude of the law in question, considered as a means employed in and for the attainment of that end. To this purpose comes the need of the ideas, expression to which is given by the two mutually and intimately connected words rule and principle.
Correspondent to every rule you may have a principle: correspondent to every principle you may have a rule.
Of these two, a rule is the object which requires first to be taken into consideration and presented to view. Why ? Because it is only by means of a rule that any moving force can be applied to the active faculty, or any guide to the intellectual—any mandate can be issued—any instruction given.
A rule is a proposition—an entire proposition: a principle is but a term: True it is, that by a principle instruction may be conveyed. Conveyed? Yes: but how? No otherwise than through the medium of a proposition— the corresponding proposition — the proposition which it has the effect of presenting to the mind. Of presenting? Yes: and we may add, and of bringing back; for only in so far as the rule has been at the time in question, or some anterior time pre-sent to the mind, can any instruction, any clear idea be presented to the mind by a principle.
A principle, therefore, is as it were an abridgment of the corresponding rule; — in the compass of a single term, it serves to convey for some particular present use, to a mind already in possession of the rule, the essence of it: it is to the rule, what the essential oil is to the plant from which it is distilled.
So it does but answer this purpose, its uses are great and indisputable.
1. It saves words, and thereby time.
2. By consisting of nothing more than a single term, and that term a noun-substantive, it presents an object which, by an apt assortment of other words, is upon occasion capable of being made up into another proposition.
So, it is true, may a rule — but only in a form comparatively embarrassing and inconvenient. This will appear by taking in hand any sentence in which a principle has place, and instead of the principle employing the corresponding rule.
Upon occasion, into any one sentence principles in any number may be inserted: and the greater the number, the stronger will be the impression of the embarrassment saved by the substitution of the principles to the rules.
A principle, as above, is no more than a single term; but that term may as well be composite, a compound of two or more words, as single. Of these words one must be a noun-substantive; the other may be either a noun-adjective or a participle; including under the appellation of a noun-adjective, a noun-substantive employed in that character, in the mode which is so happily in use in the
English language, and which gives it, in comparison with every language in which this mode is not in use, a most eminently and incontestably useful advantage.
By an axiom is meant a sort of rule, of which by certain properties, the combination of which is peculiar to it, the usefulness is pre-eminent in comparison with other rules. These properties are —
1. Incontestableness.
2. Comprehensiveness.
3. Clearness.
As to axioms, the axioms that belong to this subject are axioms of mental pathology. The facts they are enunciative of, are facts enunciative of certain sensations, as being produced by certain events or states of things operating as their efficient causes.
By a reason for any act, is conveyed the idea of its supposed addition, actual or probable, to the greatest happiness. This effect maybe produced either—1. Immediately; 2. Through an intervening chain of any number of links.
A law is a word employed in three different senses, which require to be distinguished: but in each of them it imports that the will to which it gives expression either emanates from the supreme authority in the state, or has that same authority for its support.
In one sense it denotes an entire command,— the whole matter of a command. Call this the integral sense, and the sort of law a complete law.
In the second sense it contains no more than a portion of a command; and the matter of the command may be to an indefinite ex-tent voluminous, containing laws of the first-mentioned sort in any number : in this sense it has for its synonym the word enactment: call the law in this sense a fractional or incomplete law.
In the third sense it designates the aggregate body of the enactive paragraphs to which it happens to have received the token of their being expressive of the will of the person or persons invested with the supreme authority in the political state, or of some person who acts in this behalf, under, and by virtue of that same authority.
By power of classification a species of legislative power is exercised. Thus when an enactment to any effect has been framed, if by any proposition bearing the form of a command or a rule, enlargement or retrenchment is applied to the genus, or say class of objects which contribute to constitute the subject-matter of the command;—by this means, in a sort of indirect way, by and with the help of the other words which enter into the composition of the enactment, is produced the effect of a different enactment: one of the classes of which that same subject-matter is composed receives thereby contraction or enlargement, and a fresh classification is made thereby.
Note here—in the giving existence to an enactment, three distinguishable parts are capable of being taken—or say, functions are capable of being performed; viz. the institutive, the constitutive, and the consummative; and this whether by one and the same authority, or by so many different authorities: by exercise given to the power of classification in any instance, a different consummation as it were is given to the several enactments, in the matter of which, the generic words in question are any of them contained.
Of this same function—of this same power, exercise is made by any functionary, or set of functionaries, belonging to a department other than, and thence inferior to, the legislative ; for in no other way can classes be filled up by individuals, and reality given to general ideas. Call this power, power of location, or say locative power. But what difference there is between this case and the preceding consists in this: in the former case, by no other authority than the legislative can the power be exercised—the effect produced: in the latter case it is produced in virtue of a general authorization given by the legislative authority, and by that authority is never produced, unless it be in consequence of some extraordinary occurrence.
So much for particular laws, and small masses of particular laws. Now for the divisions of the all-comprehensive aggregate in which they are all of them at all times comprised.
The Pannomion may be considered as composed of two branches—the effective and the constitutive. (It may also be considered as divided into substantive and adjective. The substantive branch of the law has for its business the giving direction and effect to human conduct; — the adjective has for its business the giving execution and effect to substantive law)
In the effective branch may be considered as contained the portion of the matter which is more immediately occupied in giving direction to the conduct of the members of the community of all classes.
The constitutive is occupied in determining who those persons in particular are, by whom the powers belonging to the effective branch shall be exercised.
Considered with relation to its connexion with good and evil employed in the character of punishment and reward for the purpose of giving direction to human conduct, the Pannomion is distinguished and divided into two branches—the directive and the sanctionative.
By the directive part, indication is given of the course which it is the desire of the law-giver that upon the occasion in question the subject-citizens should pursue.
By the sanctionative part, information is given to them of the inducement which they will find for the pursuing of those same courses.
The matter, of which this inducement is composed, is either the matter of good as above, or the matter of evil. Where and in so far as it is of the matter of good, remunerative is the name that may be given to the law: where and in so far as it is the matter of evil, penal is the name commonly given to the law—punitive, a name that may be given to it.
These two branches of a law are addressed to different descriptions of persons; — the directive to persons at large — the sanctionative to the members of the official establishment.
By the sanctionative, provision is made of the inducement, to which the legislator trusts for the compliance he seeks and expects to find on the part of those to whom the directive branch of the law is addressed. This inducement is the eventual expectation of either good or evil in the mind of those to whom the directive branch of the law is addressed: — if it be good, the law in that branch of it is syled a remunerative law: if evil a penal law.
The persons to whom a remunerative law is addressed are those functionaries belonging to the administrative department, by whom disposal is made of the money, or whatever else the matter of good employed consists of, directing them eventually to bestow the article in question on the person in question in the event of his having complied with the directive law in question, and thereby rendered the service desired at his hands.
The persons to whom a penal law is ad-dressed, are the official persons belonging to the judiciary department, presided over and directed by the judges.
Of the matter to which it may be convenient to give insertion in the civil code, and to which accordingly insertion is given in it, there are two different sorts: one of which maybe styled the directive as above — the other the expositive.
To the directive belongs that sort of matter, of which, under that name, mention has been already made — the directive, without the addition of the sanctionative, and in particular the punitive.
Not that, without the addition of the sanctionative, the directive could in general without absurdity be trusted to. Of a correspondent eventual punishment, including, where applicable, satisfaction, to be administered in case of non compliance, the existence must all along thereby be assumed. But in relation to punishment, this is the whole of that which naturally here finds its place: — in the penal code will be inserted all denunciation of extra punishment, together with what belongs to the mode in which the application made of the matter of punishment is brought about; —leaving to the civil code, the direction of the mode in which satisfaction, and in particular that branch of it which consists in the allotment of compensation for wrong, shall be administered.
The expositive matter belongs in common to, constitutes and forms part and parcel of, the directive part of the matter of the civil code, and the penal code.
Among the words and locutions, of which exposition is given in it, may be seen this or that word, in the exposition of which a prodigious quantity of matter is employed.
Take, for instance, the word title or the .word right, when employed as synonymous with and equivalent to it. Exposition of it is alike necessary to the completion of any enactment belonging either to the civil or the penal code.
Take, in the first place, the civil. The principal part of it is occupied in the declaration of to what person or persons each subject-matter of property, each object of general desire, shall belong, in such sort as to be styled his or their own — who he is or they are, to whom it belongs—or say, who have title to it. Now, then, be the subject-matter what it may — who is it that has title to it ? Who but he in whose favour some one in the list of completely collative events or states of things has place ; no event or state of things having, with relation to that same title, an ablative effect, having at the same time place in the disfavour of that same individual.
So much for the portion in question — the portion of the matter of the civil code.
But not less necessary is reference made in the penal code to that same matter.
Take, for instance, in offences severally considered, offences affecting property, — the offence of theft. To the conveying of an accurate conception of the nature of this offence, mention of title is indispensable. Why? Answer: Because, when it is under the persuasion of his having a title to the thing in question, where it is under this persuasion that the man took it, — by no one will he be regarded as having committed the offence thus denominated: thence so it is, that in any well-adapted definition of this offence, averment of the non-existence of any such persuasion must be contained.
Not that in the idea of the offence it is necessary that the idea of any portion of that same matter in particular — the idea, for ex-ample, of any one collative event more than another — should have place.
Merely expositive, and mixed: of the one sort or the other will be found to be every particle of the matter which will with most convenience be aggregated to the matter of the civil code.
Constitutive of the mixed matter will be — 1. Matter of general concernment; 2. Matter of particular concernment.

ONLY with reference to language can the attribute denoted by the word universal be with propriety attributed to the subject of law.
In each country, at each point of time, it is matter of accident whether a law to a given effect is in force; though, consideration had of the general effect, and not of the particular tenor, in no inconsiderable quantity, masses of the matter of law might be found, such as are not likely to be wanting in any country that has the use of letters. A mass of the matter of language expressive of law might be found, of which the equivalent cannot be wanting, in any country, among any assemblage of human beings, in the presence of each other, for any considerable length of time. This may be styled the language of universal law.
Follows the exposition of some of these terms, the use of which exposition upon this occasion is not so much to teach as to fix their import: —
1. Obligation. — Obligations may exist
without rights; —rights cannot exist without obligations.
Obligation—a fictitious entity, is the pro-duct of a law — a real entity.
A law, when entire, is a command; but a command supposes eventual punishment; for without eventual punishment, or the apprehension of it, obedience would be an effect without a cause.
Reward — eventual reward, is not capable of securing obedience to will signified, — is not capable of giving to will the effect of a command: — apprehension of the abstraction of reward already in possession or expectancy may do it. Yes: but though reward alone be the word employed in the description of the case, the operation signified is of the nature of punishment; — the effect of it not enjoyment, but suffering.
Obligation has place, when the desire on the part of the superior, the obliger, being signified to the obligee, be understands at the same time, that in the event of his failing to comply with such desire, evil will befal him, and that to an amount greater than that of any evil which he could sustain in compliance with that desire.
2. Right. — Otherwise than from the idea
of obligation, no clear idea can be attached to
the word right.
The efficient causes of right are two: —
1. Absence of correspondent obligation. You have a right to perform whatever you are not under obligation to abstain from the performance of. Such is the right which every human being has in a state of nature.
2. The second efficient cause of right is, presence of correspondent obligation. This obligation is the obligation imposed upon other persons at large, to abstain from disturbing you in the exercise of the first-mentioned sort of right. The first-mentioned right may be termed a naked kind of right; — this second-mentioned right, a vested or established right.
The word right, is the name of a fictitious entity: one of those objects, the existence of which is feigned for the purpose of discourse, by a fiction so necessary, that without it human discourse could not be carried on. [Though fictitious, the language cannot be termed deceptions in intention at least, whatsoever in some cases may without intention be the result]
A man is said to have it, to hold it, to possess it, to acquire it/ to lose it. It is thus spoken of as if it were a portion of matter such as a man may take into his hand, keep it for a time and let it go again. According to a phrase more common in law language than in ordinary language, a man is even spoken of as being invested with it. Vestment is clothing: invested with it makes it an article of clothing, and is as much as to say is clothed with it.
To the substantive word are frequently prefixed, as adjuncts and attributives, not only the word political, but the word natural and the word moral: and thus rights are distinguished into natural, moral, and political.
From this mode of speech, much confusion of ideas has been the result.
The only one of the three cases in which the word right has any determinate and intelligible meaning is that in which it has the adjunct political attached to it: in this ease, when a man is said to have a right (mentioning it), the existence of a certain matter of fact is asserted ; namely, of a disposition on the part of those by whom the powers of government are exercised, to cause him, to possess and so far as depends upon them to have the faculty of enjoying, the benefit to which he has a right. If, then, the fact thus asserted be true, the case is, that amongst them they are prepared on occasion to render him this service: and to this service on the part of the subordinate functionaries to whose province the matter belongs, he has, if so it be, a right; the supreme functionaries being always prepared to do what depends upon them to cause this same service to be rendered by those same subordinate functionaries.
Now, in the case of alleged natural rights, no such matter of fact has place — nor any matter of fact other than what would have place supposing no such natural right to have place. In this case, no functionaries have place — or if they have, no such disposition on their part, as above, has place; for if it have, it is the case of a political right, and not of a merely natural right. A roan is never the better for having such natural right: admit that he has it, his condition is not in any respect different from what it would be if he had it not.
If I say a man has a right to this coat or to this piece of land, meaning a right in the political sense of the word, — what I assert is a matter of fact; namely, the existence of the disposition in question as above.
If I say a man has a natural right to the coat or the land—all that it can mean, if it mean any thing and mean true, is, that I am of opinion he ought to have a political right to it; that by the appropriate services rendered upon occasion to him by the appropriate functionaries of government, he ought to be protected and secured in the use of it: be ought to be so—that is to say, the idea of his being so is pleasing to me—the idea of the opposite result displeasing.
In the English language, an imperfection, perhaps peculiar to that language, contributes to the keeping up of this confusion. In English, in speaking of a certain man and a certain coat, or a certain piece of land, I may say it is right he should have this coat or this piece of land. But in this case, beyond doubt, nothing more do I express than my satisfaction at the idea of his having this same coat or land.
This imperfection does not extend itself to other languages. Take the French, for instance. A Frenchman will not say, Il est droit que cet homme ait cet habit: what he will say is, Il est juste que cet homme ait cet habit. Cet appartient de droit a cet homme.
If the coat I have on is mine, I have a right by law to knock down, if I can, any man who by force should attempt to take it from me; and this right is what in any case it can scarcely be but that a man looks to when he says, I have a right to a constitution, to such or such an effect—or a right to have the powers of government arranged in such manner as to place me in such or such a condition in respect of actual right, actually established rights, political rights.
To engage others to join with him in applying force for the purpose of putting things into a state in which he would actually be in possession of the right, of which he thus pretends to be in possession, is at bottom the real object and purpose of the confusion thus endeavoured to be introduced into men's ideas, by employing a word in a sense different from what it had been wont to be employed, and from thus causing men to accede in words to positions from which they dissent in judgment.
This confusion has for its source the heat of argument. In the case of a political right, when the existence of it is admitted on all sides, all dispute ceases. But when so it is that a man has been contending for a political right which he either never has possessed, or haying in his possession, if fearful of losing, he will not quietly be beaten out of his claim; but in default of the political right, or as a support to the political right, he asserts he has a natural right. This imaginary natural right is a sort of thread he clings by: — in the case in question, his having any efficient political right if a supposed matter of fact, the existence of the contrary of which is but too notorious; and being so, is but too capable of being proved. Beaten out of this ground, he says he has a natural right—a right given him by that kind goddess and governess Nature, whose legitimacy who shall dispute ? And if he can manage so as to get you to admit the existence of this natural right, he has, under favour of this confusion, the hope of getting you to acknowledge the existence of the correspondent political right, and your assistance in enabling him to possess it.
It may, however, be said, to deny the existence of these rights which you call imaginary, is to give a carte blanche to the most outrageous tyranny. The rights of man anterior to all government, and superior as to their authority to every act of government, these are the rampart, and the only rampart, against the tyrannical enterprises of government. Not at all — the shadow of a rampart is not a rampart; — a fiction proves nothing — from that which is false you can only go on to that which is false. When the governed have no right, the government has no more. The rights of the governed and the rights of the government spring up together; —the same cause which creates the one creates the other.
It is not the rights of man which causes government to be established: — on the contrary, it is the non-existence of those rights. What is true is, that from the beginning of things it has always been desirable that rights should exist — and that because they do not exist; since, so long as there are no rights, there can only be misery upon the earth — no sources of political happiness, no security for person, for abundance, for subsistence, for equality:—for where is the equality between the famished savage who has caught some game, and the still more famishing savage who is dying because he has not caught any ?
Law supposes government: to establish a law, is to exercise an act of government. A law is a declaration of will — of a will conceived and manifested by an individual, or individuals, to whom the other individuals in the society to which such will has respect are generally disposed to obey.
Now government supposes the disposition to obedience: — the faculty of governing on the one part has for its sole efficient cause, and for its sole measure, the disposition to obey on the other part.
This disposition may have had for its cause either habit or convention: a convention announces the will of one moment, which the will of any other moment may revoke; — habit is the result of a system of conduct of which the commencement is lost in the abyss of time. A convention, whether it have ever yet been realized or not, is at least a conceivable and possible cause of this disposition to obedience, from which government, and what is called political society, and the only real laws, result. Habit of obedience is the cause, a little less sure — the foundation, a little less solid, of this useful, social, disposition, and happily the most common.
The true rampart, the only rampart, against a tyrannical government has always been, and still is, the faculty of allowing this disposition to obedience — without which there is no government — either to subsist or to cease. The existence of this faculty is as notorious as its power is efficacious.
Shall this habit of obedience be continued unbroken, or shall it be discontinued upon a certain occasion? Is there more to be gained than to be lost in point of happiness, by its discontinuance? Of the two masses of evil, —intensity, duration, certainty, all included— which appears to be the greatest, that to which one believes one's self exposed from continued obedience, or that to which one believes one's self exposed by its discontinuance?
On which side is the greatest probability of success? On the side of the satellites of the tyrant, who will endeavour to punish me in case of disobedience? or on the side of the friends of liberty, who will rally around me to defend me against oppression?
It is an affair of calculation: and this calculation each one must make for himself according to circumstances. It is also a calculation that no one can fail to make, either ill or well, whatever may be the language he employs, or whosoever he may be.
But this calculation is not sufficiently rapid for those who choose for their amusement the destruction and reconstruction of governments. Rights of men strongly asserted, but ill-defined, never proved; rights of men, of which every violation is an act of oppression — rights ready to be violated at every moment — rights which the government violates every time it does anything which displeases you — right of insurrection ready to be exercised the first moment that oppression occurs; — this is the only remedy which suits those who would make equality to flourish at any rate, by taking the power of governing for themselves, and leaving obedience for all others.
It is the weakness of the understanding which has given birth to these pretended natural rights; it is the force of the passions which has led to their adoption, when, desirous of leading men to pursue a certain line of conduct which general utility does not furnish sufficient motives to induce them to pursue, or when, having such motives, a man knows not how to produce and develope them, yet wishes that there were laws to constrain men to pursue this conduct, or what comes to the same thing, that they would believe that there were such laws, — it has been found the shortest and easiest method to imagine laws to this effect.
Behold the professors of natural law, of which they have dreamed—the legislating Grotii—the legislators of the human race: that which the Alexanders and the Tamer-lanes endeavoured to accomplish by traversing a part of the globe, the Grotii and the Puffendorffs would accomplish, each one sitting in his arm chair: that which the conqueror would effect with violence by his sword, the jurisconsult would effect without effort by his pen. Behold the goddess Nature! —the jurisconsult is her priest; his idlest trash is an oracle, and this oracle is a law.
The jurisconsult in his arm-chair is an individual sufficiently peaceable : he lies, — he fabricates false laws in the simplicity of his heart; — desirous of doing something, ignorant how to do better, hoping to do well, he would not willingly injure any one. From his hands the instruments he employs have passed into hands of a far different temper.
The invention was fortunate: it spared discussion—it saved research and reflection — it did not require even common sense — it spared all forbearance and toleration: — what the oath is on the part of the footpad who demands your purse, the rights of man have been in the mouth of the terrorist.
Those who govern allege legal rights — the rights of the citizen—real rights: those who wish to govern allege natural rights — the rights of man—counterfeit rights—rights which are sanctioned by the knife of the assassin, as well as the gibbet and the guillotine.
Those to whom the faculty of making these imaginary laws, instead of real laws, has been transferred, have not much trouble in making them. Constitutions are made as easily as songs: they succeed each other as rapidly, and are as speedily forgotten.
For the making of real laws, talent and knowledge are requisite: for making real laws good or bad, labour and patience are requisite: but for the making of forgeries sources of the rights of man, nothing more is required than ignorance, hardihood, and impudence.
Rights of men, when placed by the side of legal rights, resemble assignats, whether false or genuine, placed by the side of guineas or Louis dor.
Two passions have laid claim to the giving birth to the declarations of rights—to the substitution, of the declaration of particular rights to the preparation of real laws — vanity and tyranny: vanity, which believes it can lull the world asleep, by being the first to do what all the world has always bad before its eyes — tyranny, glad of finding a pretext for punishing all opposition, by directing against it the force of public hatred. Rights, there you have them always before your eyes: to deny their existence, is either to exhibit the most notorious bad faith or the most stupid blindness; the first a vice which renders you deserving of the indignation of all men—the other a weakness which consigns you to their contempt.
It is because without rights there can be no happiness, that it is at any rate determined to have rights: but rights cannot be created without creating obligations: it is that we may have rights, that we submit to obligations; and in respect to obligations, not to those alone which are strictly necessary for the establishment of the rights of which we feel the want, but also obligations such as those which may result from all the acts of authority exercised by government, which the general habit of obedience allows it to exercise.
The end of all these acts of authority should be to produce the greatest possible happiness to the community in question.
This is the true, and the only true end of the laws. Still, of the operations by which it is possible to conduct men towards this end, the effect— the constant, necessary, and most extensive effect, is to produce evil as well as good; to produce evil, that good may be produced, since upon no other conditions can it be produced.
The mystic tree of good and evil, already so interesting, is not the only one of its kind: life, society, the law, resemble it, and yield fruits equally mixed. Upon the same bough are two sorts of fruits, of which the flavour is opposite — the one sweet and the other bitter.
The sweet fruits are benefits of all kinds — the bitter and thorny fruits are burthens. The benefits are rights, which under certain circumstances are called powers—the burthens are obligations — duties.
These products, so opposed in their nature, are simultaneous in their production, and in-separable in their existence. The law cannot confer a benefit, without at the same time imposing a burthen somewhere; —it cannot create a right, without at the same time creating an obligation — and if that right be of any value, even a numerous train of obligations.
But if among these moral as well as among physical products, the sweet cannot exist without the bitter,—the bitter can exist — it exists too often — without the sweet. Such is the case with those obligations which may be called pure or barren, which are not ac-companied by rights, those benefits, those advantages, which sweeten and conceal the bitterness: — obligations which are fulfilled by useless efforts or sufferings, the fruit of every law produced by tyranny, neglecting or despising the counsels of utility, and yield-to the suggestions of caprice — unless the gratification of this caprice can be considered as a benefit.
Benefits being in themselves good, the well-instructed legislator (I mean, directed by utility) would create and confer them freely with pleasure. If it depended upon himself, he would produce no other fruits: if he could produce them in infinite quantity — he would accumulate them in the bosom of society; but as the inexorable law of nature is opposed to this course, and he cannot confer benefits without imposing burthens, all that he can do is to take care that the advantage of the benefit exceed the disadvantage of the burthen, and that this advantage be as great, and the disadvantage as small, as possible.
When, in order that a burthen may produce its effect—that the advantage expected from it may be produced, it is necessary that its weight be felt, it is called punishment.
It is thus that the non-penal branch of the law and the penal are both of them occupied in the establishing and securing every man in possession of his rights of all sorts. These rights are so many instruments of felicity — they are the instruments of whatsoever felicity a man can derive from government.
A man's political rights are either his private rights, or his constitutional rights. Under every form of government, every man has his private rights; — but there are forms of government, in which no man but one, or some other comparatively small number, have any constitutional rights.
Of private rights these five sorts have been distinguished: — 1. Rights as to person; 2. Rights as to property; 3. Rights as to power; 4. Rights as to reputation; 5. Rights as to condition in life.
All these rights have for their efficient cause certain services, which by a general and standing disposition on the part of the functionaries of government in the supreme grade are understood to have been rendered to every man, and which, in consequence, on each particular occasion the functionaries of judicature, and upon occasion the functionaries belonging to the army, hold themselves in readiness to render to him. These services consist in the giving execution and effect to all such ordinances of the government as have been made in favour and for the benefit of every individual situated in the individual situation in which in all respects he is situated.
In virtue and by means of that same standing and all-comprehensive service, the supreme rulers have given the name of wrong, and the name, quality, and consequence of an offence, to every act by which any such right is understood to have been broken, infringed, violated, invaded. In giving it the name of an offence, they have made provision of pain under the name of punishment, together with other means of repression, for the purpose of preventing the doing of it, or lessening as far as may be the number of instances in which it shall be done.
Rights are, then, the fruits of the law and of the law alone. There are no rights without law — no rights contrary to the law — no rights anterior to the law. Before the existence of laws there may be reasons for wishing that there were laws —and doubtless such reasons cannot be wanting, and those of the strongest kind; — but a reason for wishing that we possessed a right, does not constitute a right. To confound the existence of a reason for wishing that we possessed a right, with the existence of the right itself, is to confound the existence of a want with the means of relieving it. It is the same as if one should say, everybody is subject to hunger, and therefore everybody has something to eat
There are no other than legal rights;—no natural rights — no rights of man, anterior or superior to those created by the laws. The assertion of such rights, absurd in logic, is pernicious in morals. A right without a law is an effect without a cause. We may feign a law, in order to speak of this fiction—in order to feign a right as having been created; but fiction is not truth.
We may feign laws of nature — rights of nature, in order to show the nullity of real laws, as contrary to these imaginary rights; and it is with this view that recourse is had to this fiction:—but the effect of these nullities can only be null.
3. Possession. — “Better,” says a maxim of the old Roman, called civil law—"better (meaning in comparison with that of any other person,) is the condition of the possessor"— better his condition, that is to say, better the ground and reason which a person in his situation is able to make for the enjoyment of the thing, than any that can be made by anyone else.
Of the propriety and reasonableness of this notion, scarcely by anyone who hears of it, how far so ever from being learned, can a sort of feeling fail of being entertained—by no one, even of the most learned, has expression, it is believed, been ever given to it. This omission the greatest-happiness principle and that alone, can supply. In the case of loss of the possession, he who has the possession would feel a pain of privation — or say, regret, more acute—than a man of the same turn of mind, whose expectation of obtaining it was no stronger than the possessor's expectation of keeping it, would, in the event of his failing to obtain possession of it
Of so many hundred millions of persons, each of whom, in case of his having had pos-session of the thing and then lost it, would upon the losing of it have felt pain in a certain shape proportioned to the value of the thing, not one feels pain in any shape at the thoughts of not having it: not one of them but might, in the shape in question, feel pain in any quantity more or less considerable, if after having the thing in possession, he were, without receiving or expecting any equivalent for it, to cease to have it
The horse you have bred, and still keep in your stable, is yours. How is it constituted such — constituted by law? Answer: The naked right— the right of making use of it, the law has left you in possession of; — to wit, by the negative act of forbearing to inhibit you from using it: the established right, the law has conferred upon you by the order given to the judge to punish every person who shall disturb or have disturbed you in the use of it.
The horse which was yours, but by the gift you have made of it is become the horse of a friend of yours,'— how has it been constituted such — constituted by law? Answer: By a blank left as it were in the command to the judge,—that blank being left to be filled up by you in favour of this friend of yours, or any other person to whom it may happen to be your wish to transfer the horse, either gratuitously or for a price.
So long as the law in question has this blank in it, it is an incompleted, an imperfect law — it waits an act on your part to render it a perfect one. The law in its completed state is the result of two functions, into which the legislative function in this case is divided — the initiative to it, and the consummative. By the legislator, the initiative is exercised — by you, the consummative.
In the same way in which, according to this example, rights and powers are given to individual persons, they may be and are given to classes of persons. On classes of persons, the correspondent obligations not only may, but must be imposed: in short, exceptions excepted, they must be imposed on all persons of all classes; — for supposing but a single person excepted from the obligation, your right is not entire, — it is shared by you with the person so excepted. If, for example, in transferring the horse to your friend, you kept yourself from being included in the obligation to abstain from the use of the horse — if, in a word, you kept yourself excepted from the obligation imposed on other persons in general, the horse is not your friend's alone, any more than yours; but, in the language of English law, you and he are joint tenants of the horse.
4. Power. — In common speech, the word power is used in two senses; — to wit, the above sense, which may be-called the proper and legal sense—and another sense more ample, which may be styled the popular sense.
In the strictly legal sense, which is used in the penal and civil branches of law — in the popular sense, which is used in the constitutional branch.
In both cases, the fruit of the exercise of the power is looked to, and that fruit is compliance : on the part of the person subject to power, compliance with the wishes expressed, or presumed to be entertained, b v the person by whom the power is possessed. For convenience of discourse, say in' one word the power-holder.
The force of the remunerative sanction, it has above been observed, is not sufficient to constitute an obligation; it is, however, in a certain sense, sufficient, as everybody knows, to constitute power: the effect of power is produced, in so far as, by the will declared or presumed of him who in this sense is the power-holder, compliance is produced.
Power may be defined to be the faculty [In this form, the exposition is of the sort styled definition, in the narrowest sense of the word, — definitio per genua et differentiam: — exposition effected by indication given of the next superordinate class of objects in which the object in question is considered as comprehended, together with that of the qualities peculiar to it with reference to the other objects of that same class. The import of the word faculty being still more extensive than that of the word power, as may be seen by its assuming the adjunct passive, the word power is. in a certain sense, not unsusceptible of the definition per genus et differentiam: but to complete the exposition, an exposition by periphrasis may perhaps require to be added] of giving determination either to the state of the passive faculties, or to that of the active faculties, of the subject in relation to and over which it is exercised; — say the correlative subject.
Power is either coercive or allocative.
Coercive power is either restrictive or compulsive.
Of the correlative subject, the passive faculties are either insensitive or sensitive.
If merely insensitive, it belongs to the class of inanimate beings, and is referred to the still more general denomination of things.
If sensitive, to the class of animals.
If the animals of the class in question are considered as belonging to the dais of reasonable beings, the correlative subject is a person — including human beings of both sexes and all ages.
If considered as irrational, it has hitherto by lawyers been confounded with inanimate beings, and comprehended under the denomination of things.
In so far as the power is exercised with effect, the possessor of the power — say the power-holder—may, relation bad to the correlative subject, be termed the director — the correlative subject the directee.
5. Command. — An instrument which as above has been mentioned as necessary to the generation of the fictitious entities, called a right and a power, is, as has been seen, a command. But a command is a discourse, expressive of the wish of a certain person, who, supposing his power independent of that of any other person, and to a certain extent sufficiently ample in respect of the subject-matters — to wit, persons, things moveable and immoveable, and acts of persons, and times— is a legislator;—say a legislator in the singular : for simplicity sake, the case of a division of the legislative power among divers persons or classes of persons, may on this occasion be put aside.
6. Quasi Commands—Now then comes a doubt, and with it a question:—in the state of things you have hitherto been supposing, the law in question is of that sort called statute law: and in the case of statute law the print of a command is sufficiently visible. But obligations are created — rights established, not only by statute law, but by another species of law called common law: Where in this case is the command? — where is the person by whom it has been issued ?—where, in a word, is the legislator? The judge is not a legislator. Far from claiming so to be, he would not so much as admit himself to be so: he puts aside, if not the function, at any rate the name.
Hitherto we have been in the region of realities: we are now of necessity transported into the region of fictions. In the domain of common law, everything is fiction but the power exercised by the judge.
On each occasion the judge does, it is true, issue a command: — this command is his decree; but this decree he on every occasion confesses he would not on any occasion have the power of issuing with effect, were it not for a command, general in its extent, and in such sort general as to include and give authority to this individual decree of his.
To be what it is, a command, general or individual, must be the command of some person. Who in this case is this person? Answer: Not any legislator; for if it were, the law would be a statute law. A person being necessary, and no real one to be found, hence comes the necessity of a fictitious one. The fictitious one, this fictitious person, is called the common Jaw—or more generally, that he may be confounded with the real person in whose image he is made, the law.
To warrant the individual decree which he is about to pronounce, the judge comes out with some general proposition, saying, in words or in effect, thus saith THE LAW. On the occasion of the issuing of this sham law, the pretext always is, that it is but a copy of a proposition, equally general, delivered on some former occasion by some other judge or train of successive judges.
In this proposition there may be or may not be a grain of truth, but whether there be or be not, the individual decree has in both cases alike the effect of a law — of a real law — issued by a legislator avowing himself such, and acknowledged as such.
A command being the generic name of the really existing instrument of power called a law, let a quasi command be the name of that counterfeit instrument feigned to answer the purpose of it, to produce the effects of it, for the purpose of enabling the judge to produce, in the way of exacting compliance, the effect of a law.
Of this appellation the use and need will be seen in the procedure code, on the occasion of the formula called the demand paper, provided for the purpose of giving commencement to a suit in that same code.
Supposing the connexion between a command in the mandatory form, and a proposition in the assertive form, made out and explained: whatsoever proposition would, if emanating from the legislator, have constituted an apposite ground for the demand—to wit, the demand made in the demand paper, elsewhere spoken of — a proposition to that same effect might equally well serve, if stated as being a proposition conformable to the doc-trine of the common law. In the one case, the proposition would be a reality, in the other case a fiction: in the one case, what were the proper words of it could not be a subject-matter of dispute; in the other case it might, and would frequently be the subject-matter of dispute: still, however, in the character of a ground of inference, it would in both cases be equally intelligible.
Be this as it may —not to the plan here proposed would the imperfections of this part of the instrument of demand with propriety be ascribable. The root of the imperfection is in the very nature of the common law. To its supreme inaptitude, by the proposed instrument, such remedy as the nature of the case admitted is applied, and the use thus made of the common law is the result — not of choice, but of unresistible necessity. How sadly inadequate a portion of this fictitious law is, in the character of a succedaneum, to a correspondent and equivalent portion of real law, would on each occasion be visible to every eye; and as often as it came under the eye, so often would the urgency of the demand for the substitution of real to sham law be forced upon the attention. What would be in the power of the legislature to do at any time, and in the compass of a day, is to substitute this plain speaking form of demand to the existing absurd and deceptious one: what it is not in his power to do in the compass of a day, nor perhaps till at the end of some years, is the complete substitution of real to sham and impostor's law, —substitute, and audacious rival of the only genuine law.

§ 1. Axioms of Mental Pathology — a necessary ground for all legislative arrangements.
BY an axiom of mental pathology, considered as a ground for a legislative arrangement, understand a proposition expressive of the consequences in respect of pleasure or pain, or both, found by experience to result from certain sorts of occurrences, and in particular from such in which human agency bears a part: in other words, expressive of the connexion between such occurrences as are continually taking place, or liable to take place, and the pleasures and pains which are respectively the results of them.
Practical uses of these observations, two: — 1. With regard to pleasures, the learning how to leave them undisturbed, and protected against disturbance — (for as to the giving-increase to them by the power of the legislator to anything beyond a very inconsiderable amount, it is neither needful nor possible) 2. With regard to pains, the learning how on each occasion to minimize the amount of them in respect of magnitude and number — number of the individuals suffering under them — magnitude of the suffering in the case of each individual.
Arithmetic and medicine — these are the branches of art and science to which, in so far as the maximum of happiness is the object of his endeavours, the legislator must look for his means of operation: — the pains or losses of pleasure produced by a maleficent act correspond to the symptoms produced by a disease.
Experience, observation, and experiment— these are the foundations of all well-grounded medical practice: experience, observation, and experiment — such are the foundations of all well-grounded legislative practice.
In the case of both functionaries, the subject-matter of operation and the plan of operation is accordingly the same — the points of difference these: — In the case of the medical curator, the only individual who is the subject-matter of the operations performed by him, is the individual whose sufferings are in question, to whom relief is to be administered. In the .case of the legislator, there are no limits to the description of the persons to whom it may happen to be the subject-matter of the operations performed by him.
By the medical curator, no power is possessed other than that which is given either by the patient himself, or in case of his inability, by those to whose management it happens to him to be subject: — by the legislatorial curator, power is possessed applicable to all persons, without exception, within his field of service; each person being considered in his opposite capacities — namely, that of a person by whom pleasure or pain, or both, may be experienced, and that of a person at whose hands pleasure or pain, or both, may be experienced.
Axioms of corporal pathology may be styled those most extensively applicable positions, or say propositions, by which statement is made of the several sorts of occurrences by which pleasure or pain are or have place in the human body: — as also, the results observed to follow from the performance of such operations as have been performed, and the application made of such subject-matters as have been applied for the purpose of giving increase to the aggregate of pleasure, or causing termination, alleviation, or prevention, to have place in regard to pain.
Axioms of mental pathology may be styled those most commonly applicable propositions by which statement is made of the several occurrences by which pleasure or pain is made to have place in the human mind:—as also, the results observed to follow from the performance of such operations as have been performed, and the application of such subject-matters as have been applied for the purpose of effecting the augmentation of the aggregate of the pleasures, or the diminution of the aggregate of the pains, by the termination, alleviation, or prevention of them respectively, when individually considered.
Security — subsistence — abundance — equality — i.e. minimization of inequality:— by these appellatives, denomination has been given to the particular ends which stand next in order to the universal, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This being admitted, these are the objects which will be in view in the formation of the several axioms of pathology which present themselves as suitable to the purpose of serving as guides to the practice of the legislatorial curator.
Unfortunately, on this occasion, the imperfection of language has produced an embarrassment, which it does not seem to be in the power of language altogether to remove: all that can be done, is to lessen and alleviate it. Subsistence—abundance—equality, — these three immediately subordinate ends are conversant about the same matter; to wit, the matter of wealth. But security, besides a matter of its own, is conversant with that same matter, with which, as above, they are conversant; to wit, the matter of wealth: security for the matter of wealth — or say, to each individual, security for that portion of the matter of wealth which at the time in question belongs to him, and is called his. Security is accordingly security against all such maleficent acts by which any portion of the matter of wealth which ought to be at the disposal of the individual in question, is prevented from being at his disposal at the time in question. Now, the not having at his disposal at the time in question a certain portion of the matter of wealth, is indeed one efficient cause of pain to the individual in question, be he who he may, but it is but one out of several In addition to the matter of wealth, sources of pleasure, and of exemption from pain, are certain others which have been found reducible under the following denomitions; to wit, power, reputation, and condition in life: — condition in life, to wit, in so far at, reference had to the individual whose it is, the effect is considered as beneficial — this complex subject-matter including in it the three subject-matters above mentioned — that is to say, the matter of wealth, or in two words, power and reputation.
Correspondent to these several subject-matters of security are so many classes of offences — of maleficent acts, by the performance of which such security is disturbed. Offences affecting property—offences affecting power — offences affecting reputation — offences affecting condition in life.
But all these subject-matters are, with reference to the individual in question, distinct from him, and exterior to him; — and in a more immediate way — and otherwise than through the medium of any of these out-works, he stands exposed to be made to suffer pain, as well of mind as of body, by the agency of every other individual, in whose instance a motive adequate to the purpose of producing an act by which it will be inflicted, has place. Thus, then, in addition to offences affecting property—offences affecting power — offences affecting reputation — offences affecting condition in life, — we have offences affecting person, considered with reference to its two distinguishable parts, body and mind.
So many of these classes of maleficent acts, so many branches of security: in which list, as being the most obviously and highly important, and most simple in the conception presented by it, security against maleficent acta affecting person—more shortly, security for person, presents itself as claiming to occupy the first place; after which, security for property, and so forth, as above.
§ 2. Axioms applicable to Security for Person.
Axioms forming the grounds for such legislative arrangements as have for their object and their justification, the affording security for person against such maleficent acts, to which it stands exposed.
1. The pleasure derivable by any person from the contemplation of pain suffered by another, is in no instance so great as the pain so suffered.
2. Not even when the pain so suffered has been the result of an act done by the person in question, for no other purpose than that of producing it.
Hence, one reason for endeavouring to give security against pain of body or mind, resulting from human agency, whether from design or inattention.
Now, suppose the pain to be the result of purely natural agency, — no human agency having any part in the production of it — no human being deriving any satisfaction from the contemplation of it, — the result is still the same.
Hence one reason for endeavouring to give security against pain of body or mind result-ing from casualty, or as the word is, when the evil is considered as having place upon a large scale, — calamity.
Axiom indicative of the reasons which form the grounds of the enactments prohibitive of maleficent acts, productive of evil, affecting persons — that is to say, either in body or mind — in any mode not comprised in one or other of the modes of maleficence from which the acts constituted offences in and by the penal code receive their denomination, via. Offences produced by the irascible appetite:—
When by one person, without gratification sought other than that derived from the contemplation of suffering in this or that shape, as about to be produced on the part of that other gratification in a certain shape, is accordingly produced in the breast of such evil doer,—call the gratification the pleasure of antipathy satisfied— or of ill-will satisfied.
If this antipathy has had its rise in the conception that by the party in question fsay the victim), evil in any shape has been done to the evil doer, — the pleasure of antipathy gratified takes the name of the pleasure of vengeance—or say revenge.
Axiom. In no case is there any reason for believing that the pleasure of antipathy gratified is so great as the pain suffered by him at whose expense, as above, the pleasure is reaped.
Offences to which the axiom applies are — 1. Offences affecting body; 2. Offences affecting the mind other than those belonging to the other classes; 3. Offences affecting reputation—the reputation of the sufferer— other than those by which the reputation of the evil doer is increased; 4. Offences affecting the condition in life of the sufferer, other than those by which the reputation of the evil doer is increased or expected to be increased.
For justification of the legislative arrangements necessary to afford security against maleficent acts affecting the person, what it is necessary to show is, that by them pain will not be produced in such quantity as will cause it to outweigh the pleasure that would have been produced by the maleficent acts so prevented.
For this purpose, in order to complete the demonstration and render it objection-proof, in certain cases, it will be necessary to take into account not only the evil of the first order, but the evil of the second order likewise.
First, then, considering the matter on the footing of the effects of the first order on both sides,—Axioms bearing reference to the effects of the first order on both sides, are the following: —
Axioms serving as grounds and reasons for the provision made by the legislator for general security; — to wit, against the evils respectively produced by the several classes and genera of offences.
Case 1. An offence affecting person, or say corporal vexation, in any one of its several shapes — offender's motive, ill-will or spite
— the enjoyment of the offender will not be so great as the evil of the first order, consisting in the suffering experienced by the party vexed.
Case 2. So if the offence be an offence productive of mental vexation — and the motive the same.
Case 3. So if the offence be an offence affecting reputation.
Case 4. So, exceptions excepted, in the case of every other class or genus of offences, the motive being ill-will or spite, as above.
Case 5. Exceptions are among offences affecting person and reputation jointly, the offences having for their motive sexual desire; to wit—I. Sexual seduction, allurative, or say enticitive; 2. Sexual seduction compulsory ; 3. Rape; 4. Vexatious lascivious contrectation.
In any of these cases, what may happen is — that the enjoyment of the offender may be equal or more than equal to the suffering of the party wronged; in either of which cases the evil of the first order has no place. But to all other persons, the suffering of the one part will present itself as being to an indefinite degree greater than the enjoyment of the offender and proportioned to the apparent excess will be the actual' alarm on the part and on behalf of persons exposed to the like wrong from the same cause: and thence, so far as regards alarm, will be the evil of the second order.
Addendum to security axioms: — Be the modification of the matter of prosperity what it may, by losing it without an equivalent, a man suffers according to, and in proportion to, the value of it in his estimation— the value by him put upon it.
Value may be distinguished into —1. General, or say value in the way of exchange; and 2. Special, or say idiosyncratical — value in the way of use in his own individual instance.
Note, that the value of a thing in the way of exchange arises out of, and depends altogether upon, and is proportioned to, its value in the way of use :—for no man would give anything that had a value in the way of use in exchange for anything that had no such value.
But value in the way of use may be distinguished into general, which has place so far as, and no further than, the thing is of use to persons in general—and special or idiosyncratical, which has place in so far as, in the case of this or that person in particular, the thing has a value in the way of use over and above the value which it has in the case of persons in general: of which use, that of the pretium affectionis, the value of affection, is an example.
Definition: When from any cause—human agency or any other—a mass of the matter of wealth, or of the matter of prosperity in any other shape, is made to go out of an individual's possession or expectancy without his consent, the pain produced in his breast by contemplation of its non-existence, or say by the loss of it, call the pain of disappointment: he being disappointed at the thought of the good which, it having been in his possession or expectancy, he has thus lost.
Among the objects of law in every community, is the affording security against this pain in this shape.
Axiom : The pleasure of antipathy or revenge produced in the breast of the evil-doer by the contemplation of a pain of disappointment produced in the breast of the sufferer, is not in any case so great in magnitude as that same pain.
To this axiom corresponds, as being thereon grounded, a fundamental principle entitled the disappointment-preventing principle.
Operation necessary for the establishment and continuance of security, — Fixation of the text of the laws.
For leading expectation, the law need only be exhibited, provided that it be clear, and not too vast for comprehension. But that it may be exhibited, it is necessary that it exist. The greatest and most extensive cause of regret respecting English law, is, — that as respects a large portion, it has no existence. Instead of laws, it cannot even be said that we possess shadows of law: — shadows imply substances by which they are formed; — all that we possess is a phantom, conjured up by each one at his pleasure, to fill the place of the law. It is of these phantoms that common law, unwritten, judge-made law, is composed.
A discussion upon a point of unwritten or common law has been defined a competition of opposite analogies. In giving this definition, the most severe and well-deserved censure was passed both upon this species of law, and upon the carelessness of the legislators who have tolerated its pernicious existence — who have allowed the security of their fellow-citizens to remain without foundation, tossed about by the interminable and always shifting competition of opposite analogies, — who have left it upon a quicksand, when they might have placed it upon a rock.
§ 3. Axioms pathological, applicable to Subsistence.
Axiom 1. Though to each individual his own subsistence be, by the nature of man, rendered the chief object of his care, and during his infancy an object of care to the author of his existence, yet a considerable portion of the aggregate number of the members of the community there will always be, in whose instance a subsistence cannot have place (without the legislator's care) without provision made by the legislator to that effect.
2. For the subsistence of all, and accordingly of these, provision will to a certain degree have been made by the provision for security in all its shapes, and for security of property in particular: as also for abundance; for abundance, because of the abundance possessed by some is composed a stock, a fund, out of which matter is capable of being taken applicable to the purpose of affording, whether immediate or through exchange, subsistence to others. But for the subordinate end to the purpose here in question, the utmost of what can be done for these two other subordinate ends, taken together, will not of itself be sufficient.
Of the nonpossession of the matter of subsistence in such quantity as is necessary to the support of life, death is the consequence: and such natural death is preceded by a course of suffering much greater than what is attendant on the most afflictive violent deaths employed for the purpose of punishment.
Rather than continue to labour under this affliction, individuals who are experiencing it will naturally and necessarily, in proportion as they find opportunity, do what depends upon them towards obtaining, at the charge of others, the means of rescuing themselves from it: and in proportion as endeavours to this purpose are employed, or believed to be intended to be employed, security for property is certainly diminished — security for person probably diminished on the part of all others.
By the coercive authority of the legislator provision cannot be made for the indigent, otherwise than by defalcation from the mass of the matter of abundance possessed by the relatively opulent, nor yet, without a correspondent defalcation more or less considerable, from security for property on their part.
In every habitable part of the earth, people, so soon as they behold themselves and their eventual offspring secured against death for want of the matter of subsistence, which security cannot be afforded otherwise than by correspondent defalcation from the matter of abundance in the hands of the relatively opulent, will continue to effect addition to the number of its inhabitants. But this augmentation thus produced will proceed with much greater rapidity than any addition that can be made to the quantity of the matter of subsistence possessed, as above, by the indigent, by defalcation made at the expense of security for property, as well as from the matter of abundance, by correspondent defalcation from the matter of abundance in the hands of the relatively opulent.
The consequence is, that sooner or later, on every habitable part of the earth's surface, the community will be composed of three classes of inhabitants: — 1. Those by whom, with the addition of more or less of the matter of abundance, the matter of subsistence is possessed in a quantity sufficient for the preservation of life and health; — 2. Those who, being in a state in which they are perishing for want of the matter of subsistence, are on their way to speedy death; — 3. Those who to save themselves from impending death are occupied in waging war upon the rest, providing the means of subsistence for them-selves at the expense of the security of all, and the matter of subsistence and abundance in the possession of all.
So long as by arrangements taken for the purpose by government, the thus redundant part of the population can be cleared off by being conveyed from the habitable part of the globe in question to some other part, these two classes of quickly perishing individuals may be prevented from receiving formation, or if formed, from receiving increase. But in no one part of the habitable globe can this be done by government without expense, nor the matter of expense be obtained without defalcation made from security, and suffering from loss, by forced contribution as above ; and sooner or later, in proportion as property and security for property establishes itself, the whole surface of the habitable globe cannot but be fully peopled, in such sort, that from no one spot to any other could human creatures be transplanted in a living and about to live state.
Human benevolence can, therefore, hardly be better employed than in a quiet solution of these difficulties, and in the reconciliation of a provision for the otherwise perishing indigent, with this continual tendency to an increase in the demand for such provision.
§ 4. Axioms applying to Abundance.
1. Included in the mass of the matter of abundance, is the mass of the matter of subsistence. The matter of wealth is at once the matter of subsistence and the matter of abundance : the sole difference is the quantity; — it is less in the case of subsistence — greater in the case of abundance.
2. If of two persons, one has the minimum of subsistence without addition, — and the other, that same minimum with an addition, — the former has the matter of subsistence, the latter the matter of abundance: — under-stand, in comparison with him who has no-thing beyond the minimum of the matter of subsistence, — the term abundance being a comparative, a relative term.
3. The matter of subsistence being, in the instance of each individual, necessary to existence, and existence necessary to happiness, — suppose a quantity of the matter of wealth sufficient for the subsistence of 10,000 persons, at the disposition of the legislator; — more happiness will be producible, by giving to each one of the 10,000 a particle of the matter of subsistence, than by giving to 5000 of them a portion of the matter of abundance composed of two particles of the matter of subsistence, and then giving none to the remaining 5000: since, on that supposition, the 5000 thus left destitute would soon die through a lingering death.
4. But suppose that, after giving existence to the 10,000, and to each of them a particle of the matter of subsistence, the legislator have at his disposal a quantity of the matter of wealth sufficient for the subsistence of other 10,000 persons, and that he have the option — of either giving existence to an additional number of persons to that same amount, with a minimum of the matter of subsistence to each, — or instead, without making any addition to the first 10,000, of giving an addition to the quantity of wealth possessed by them, — a greater addition to the aggregate quantity of happiness would be made by dividing among the first 10,000 the whole additional quantity of wealth, than by making any addition to the number of persons brought into existence. For, supposing the whole 10,000 having each of them the mini-mum of the matter of subsistence on any given day, — the next day, in consequence of some accident, they might cease to have it, and in consequence cease to have existence: whereas, if of this same 10,000, some had, in addition to his minimum of the matter of subsistence, particles one or more of the matter of abundance, here would be a correspondent mass of the matter of wealth, capable of being by the legislator so disposed of as to be made to constitute the matter of subsistence to those who, otherwise being without subsistence, would soon be without existence.
5. Not that, as between the matter of subsistence, and the matter of abundance, the identity is other than virtual — identity with reference to the purpose here in question, to wit, the effect on happiness; — and this virtually depends upon the facility of obtaining one of the sorts of matter necessary to subsistence, in exchange for matter neither necessary, nor so much as contributing to subsistence — potatoes, for example, in exchange for coin; but so far as is necessary to the guidance of the legislator s practice, this virtual identity always has had, and is likely always to have place.
6. Thus it is that the matter of abundance, as contradistinguished from the matter of subsistence, is contributory to happiness, in three distinguishable ways or capacities: — I. As contributing in a direct way to enjoyment, in a degree over and above what could be contributed by the mere matter of subsistence ; 2. As contributing in an indirect way to security, to wit, by its capacity of serving, in the way of exchange, for the obtainment of the efficient instruments of security in any of these shapes; 3. As eventually contributing, in the same indirect way, to subsistence.
§ 5. Axioms applying to Equality [See also Principles of the Civil Code, ch. 6, Vol I. p. 304] in respect of wealth.
I. Case or state of things the first. – The quantities of wealth in question, considered as being in a quiescent state, actually in the hands of the two parties in question: neither entering into, nor going out of the hands of either.
1. Cateris paribus, — to every particle of the matter of wealth corresponds a particle of the matter of happiness. Accordingly, thence,
2. So far as depends upon wealth, — of two persons having unequal fortunes, he who has most wealth must by a legislator be regarded as having most happiness.
3. But the quantity of happiness will not go on increasing in anything near the same proportion as the quantity of wealth : —ten thousand times the quantity of wealth will not bring with it ten thousand times the quantity of happiness. It will even be matter of doubt, whether ten thousand times the wealth will in general bring with it twice the happiness. Thus it is, that,
4. The effect of wealth in the production of happiness goes on diminishing, as the quantity by which the wealth of one man exceeds that of another goes on increasing: in other words, the quantity of happiness produced by a particle of wealth (each particle being of the same magnitude) will be less and less at every particle; the second will produce less than the first, the third than the second, and so on.
5. Minimum of wealth, say £10 per year; — greatest excess of happiness produced by excess in the quantity of wealth, as 2 to 1: — magnitude of a particle of wealth, £1 a year. On these data might be grounded a scale or table, exhibiting the quantities of happiness produced, by as many additions made to the quantity of wealth at the bottom of the scale, as there are pounds between £10 and £10,000.
II. Case, or state of things the second, — the particles of wealth about to enter into the hands of the parties in question.
1. Fortunes unequal:—by a particle of wealth, if added to the wealth of him who has least, more happiness will be produced, than if added to the wealth of him who has most.
2. Particles of wealth at the disposition of the legislator, say 10,000;—happiness of the most wealthy to that of the least wealthy, say (as per No. 5,) as 2 to 1:—by giving to each one of 10,000 a particle of wealth, the legislator will produce 5000 times the happiness he would produce by giving the 10,000 particles to one person.
3. On these data might be grounded a scale, exhibiting the quantities of happiness produced, by so many additions made as above to the minimum of wealth, to the respective happiness of any number of persons, whose respective quantities of wealth exceed one another, by the amount of a particle in each instance.
III. Case, or state of things the third, — the particles of wealth about to go out of the hands of the parties.
1. By the subtraction of a particle of the matter of wealth, a less subtraction from happiness will be produced, if made from the wealth of him who has the matter of abundance, than if from the wealth of him who has the matter of subsistence only.
2. So, if from the wealth of him who has a larger portion of the matter of abundance, than if from the wealth of him who has not so large a portion of the matter of abundance.
3. Fortunes equal, and the aggregate sum subtracted being given, the greater the num-ber of the persons from whose wealth the subtraction is made, the less will be the sub-traction thereby made from the aggregate of happiness.
4. Fortunes unequal, still less will be the subtraction of happiness, if it be in the ratio of their fortunes that the subtraction is made, the greatest quantity being subtracted from those whose fortunes are greatest.
5. A quantity of the matter of wealth may be assigned, so small, that if subtracted from the fortune of a person possessed of a certain quantity of the matter of abundance, no sensible subtraction of happiness would be the result.
6. The larger the fortune of the individual in question, the greater the probability that, by the subtraction of a given quantity of the matter of wealth, no subtraction at all will be made from the quantity of his happiness.
7. So likewise, if the ratio of the sum to be subtracted, to the aggregate mass from which it is to be subtracted, be so great, that by the subtraction of it, subtraction of a quantity, more or less considerable, cannot but be made from the aggregate of happiness. — still the larger, in the case of each individual, the aggregate of wealth is from which the subtraction is made, the less will be the quantity of happiness so subtracted, as above.
IV. Case, or state of things the fourth, — the particles of wealth about to go out of the hands of the one party into the hands of the other.
1. Fortunes equal: — take from the one party a portion of the matter of wealth and give it to the other, — the quantity of happiness gained to the gainer of the wealth will not be so great as the quantity of happiness lost to the loser of the wealth.
2. Fortunes unequal: — the poorer the loser, the richer the gainer: greater in this case is the diminution produced in the mass of happiness by the transfer, than in the last mentioned case.
3. Fortunes again unequal: — the richer the loser, the poorer the gainer: the effect produced on happiness by the transfer may in this case be either loss or gain.
Whether it be the one or the other, will depend partly upon the degree of the inequality, partly upon the magnitude of the portion of wealth transferred. If the inequality be very small, and the wealth transferred also small, the effect produced on the sum of happiness may be loss. But if either be — much more if both be other than, very small, the effect on happiness will be gain.
4. Income of the richer, say £100,000 a-year — income of the less rich, say £99,099 a-year: wealth taken from the first, and transferred to the less rich, £1 a-year: — on the sum of happiness the effect will be on the side of loss; — more happiness will be lost by the richer than gained by the less rich.
Hence one cause of the preponderance produced on the side of evil by the practice called gaming.
5. Income of the richer loser, £100,000 a-year; — income of the less rich gainer, £10 a-year; — wealth lost to the richer, gained by the less rich, £1 a-year: — on the sum of happiness the effect will be on the side of gain. More happiness will be gained by the less rich gainer, than lost by the more rich loser.
Thus it is, that if the effects of the first order were alone taken into account, the consequence would be, that, on the supposition of a new constitution coming to be established, with the greatest happiness of the greatest number for its end in view, sufficient reason would have place for taking the matter of wealth from the richest and transferring it to the less rich, till the fortunes of all were reduced to an equality, or a system of inequality so little different from perfect equality, that the difference would not be worth calculating.
But call in now the effects of the second and those of the third order, and the effect is reversed: to maximisation of happiness would be Substituted universal annihilation in the first place of happiness — in the next place of existence. Evil of the second order, —annihilation of happiness by the universality of the alarm, and the swelling of danger into certainty: — Evil of the third order,—annihilation of existence by the certainty of the non-enjoyment of the fruit of labour, and thence the extinction of all inducement to labour.
Independently of the destruction which would thus be produced by carrying, or even by the known intention of carrying to its utmost possible length the equalization, or say levelling system, as above, diminution would be effected in the aggregate of happiness, by the extinction of tie fund afforded by the matter of abundance for keeping un-diminished the stock of the matter of wealth necessary for subsistence.
On consideration of what is stated above, it will be found that the plan of distribution applied to the matter of wealth, which is most favourable to universality of subsistence, and thence, in other words, to the maximization of happiness, is that in which, while the fortune of the richest — of him whose situation is at the top of the scale, is greatest, the degrees between the fortune of the least rich and that of the most rich are most numerous,—in other words, the gradation most regular and insensible.
The larger the fortunes of the richest are, the smaller will be the number of those whose fortunes approach near to that high level: the smaller, therefore, the number of those from whose masses of property the largest defalcation could by possibility be made : — and, moreover, the larger those masses, the greater would be the difficulty which the legislator would experience as to the obtaining at their charge such defalcation as the nature of the case would not exclude the possibility of making.
Thus, for example, it would, in case of over population, be easier in England, or even in Ireland, to ward off famine for a time, than it would be in British India.
Equality requires, that though it be at the expense of all the other members of the com-munity, the income of those whose income is composed of the wages of labour be maximized. Reason: Of these are composed the vast majority of the whole number of the members of the community.
Exceptions excepted, equality requires that the profits of stock be minimized. Reason: Because the net profit of stock is composed of the mass, or say portion remaining to the employer of the stock, after deduction made of the wages of the labour applied to it.
Exception will be — if this supposed case be really exemplified — where the possessors of the wages of labour are so many, and the possessors of the profits of stock so few, that by a small addition to the one, no sensible defalcation will be made from the other.
§ 6. Axioms relating to Power, Rank, and Reputation.
By axioms relating to power, understand self-serving power, exempt from the obligation by which it is converted into trust.
As between individual and individual, the pleasure to the superior, to the power-holder, from the possession and exercise of the power, is not so great as the pain experienced by the party subjected.
Therefore, only when converted into extra-benefiting by appropriate obligation, can it be conducive to greatest happiness.
The same observations will equally apply to rank, and factitious estimation produced by rank.
So also to extra reputation, or say estimation, unless when acquired by service rendered to others.
The principle corresponding to these axioms, as to equality, is the inequality-minimizing principle.


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